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Undergraduate Philosophy Colloquium
March 5, 2016 @ 9:30 am - 4:30 pm
The Carolina Philosophy Club presents the Annual Undergraduate Conference in Philosophy at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill
Saturday, March 5th
Caldwell 213
9:30-10:00: Breakfast
10:00-10:50: Stephen Wilke
Southern Illinois University Edwardsville
Aristotelian Usage of Mακάριόν and Eὐδαιμονία
11:00-12:30 (provisional): Keynote Address
Dr. Christopher Lebron
Assistant Professor, African-American Studies & Philosophy
Yale University
12:30-2:20: Lunch break
2:30-3:20: Fangfang Lee
New York University
Spatial Relativity
3:30-4:20: Hilda Loury
University of California Los Angeles
The Phenomenology of Temporal Experience
Abstracts
Stephen Wilke
Southern Illinois University Edwardsville
Aristotelian Usage of Mακάριόν and Eὐδαιμονία
In this paper I will examine the relationship between the Greek words Eudaimonia and Makarion and determine the effect of this relationship on the monist/inclusivist argument. I will discuss the possibility that they have three different types of relationship, synonymy, difference in degree, and categorical difference. I will then apply this to the monist/inclusivist argument on the role of external goods in Aristotelian ethics.
Finally I will suggest a course of action that we can take in order to alleviate issues similar to this one in future readings of Aristotle. The primary means for this will be through a skeptical approach to the texts. The secondary, and more difficult, solution would be to find a better way to arrange our existing Aristotelian texts.
Keynote Address
Dr. Christopher Lebron
Assistant Professor, African-American Studies & Philosophy
Yale University
Fangfang Lee
New York University
Spatial Relativity
Are the properties of space a mere human construction or a reconstruction of objective reality? In this paper, I present the views of two philosophers, Poincaré and Merleau-Ponty, to demonstrate the properties of space are a construction of human practices. I’ll lay out the arguments of each author and describe the similarity, namely, a tendency to argue for spatial relativity.
Hilda Loury
University of California Los Angeles
The Phenomenology of Temporal Experience
In this paper, I will explore the dissonance between “physical explanation” and “human experience,” while focusing on the experience of temporal passage.
As a starting point, I will introduce J.E. McTaggart’s A-Series theory of time and B-Series theory of time. The A-Series illustrates how humans intuitively experience time; the past is fixed and expired, while the present moment seamlessly unfolds forward into an open future. On the other hand, the B-Series is very unlike the intuitive experience of time; “time” is merely the culmination of “static snapshots,” where each snapshot possesses different properties than the preceding snapshot and succeeding snapshot. Furthermore, there is no present moment or direction of time. For the purposes of this paper, and in agreement with McTaggart’s thesis, I will assume that the B-Series theory of time is true.
Second, I will consider two problematic implications of the B-Series, i.e. the knowledge asymmetry and the experience asymmetry. If the past and future are equally real and fixed, why do we only possess knowledge about the past, and know nothing of the future? Moreover, why do we exclusively experience time as unfolding in the direction of the future, and never toward the past?
Third, I will consider four possible explanations, which are grounded in physical mechanics or neural architecture, that aim to reconcile physical explanation with human experience, i.e. the static snapshot world of the B-Series with the dynamic present as we experience it. These four theories are the Specious Present Theory, Retention Theory, Neuron Theory, and Blind Spot Theory. I will argue that no physical explanation can provide the reconciliation that I am looking for.
Fourth, I will consider cases that highlight the inconsistent and subjective nature of temporal flow to further motivate the peculiarity of and explanatory gap between physical explanation and human experience.
Finally, in section V, I will argue that the puzzle of temporal experience, i.e. the explanatory gap between physical explanation and human experience, boils down to a problem of qualia, and thus, is a result of the “hard problem of consciousness.”
