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Speaker Series: Hartry Field (NYU)

213 Caldwell Hall

“Epistemology from an Evaluativist Perspective” Abstract: I’ll articulate a kind of “evaluativist” (“non-descriptivist”?) view of epistemology, and contrast it with both normative realist views and reliabilist views.  Much of the focus will be on how this metaphilosophical perspective can affect ground-level … Read more

Speaker Series: Michael Pelczar (University of Singapore)

213 Caldwell Hall

"Phenomenalism Redux" Abstract: Everyone knows about the mind-body problem. Less well-known is the fact that philosophers originally took it to be a problem about the nature of body, rather than a problem about the nature of mind. This paper returns … Read more

Speaker Series: Michael Della Rocca (Yale)

213 Caldwell Hall

Michael Della Rocca teaches at the Department of Philosophy at Yale University. His primary interests are in early modern (17th and 18th century) philosophy, especially the rationalist philosophers Spinoza. Michael also has a significant (non-philosophical) interest in the Mets. "Tamers, Deniers, and Me" This … Read more

Talk: Justin Snedegar (St Andrews)

Caldwell 213

"Deliberation, Reasons, and Alternatives" Abstract: Many philosophers hold that normative reasons for action must be (perhaps among other things) good premises for deliberation about what to do. This opens up the possibility of arguing for certain claims about the nature … Read more

Department Talk: Paul Hurley, “Exiting The Consequentialist Circle”

Caldwell 213

“Exiting The Consequentialist Circle: Two Senses of Bringing It About” Paul Hurley Abstract: Consequentialism is a state of affairs centered moral theory that finds support in state of affairs centered views of value, reason, action, and desire/preference.  Together these views … Read more

Department talk: Sarah Stroud, “Conceptual Disagreement”

Caldwell 213

"Conceptual Disagreement" Can you disagree with someone without thinking that what they say (or think) is false? As we shall see, this is not only possible but (we shall argue) quite frequent. But we will reach this conclusion only via … Read more

Public lecture: “What is Wrong with Lying?”

Caldwell 105 ,

"What is Wrong with Lying?" Sarah Stroud: Abstract: Most of us would confidently say that lying is wrong—or, at least, that there is something wrong with lying. But what exactly is wrong with it? It turns out to be more … Read more