Department talk: Sarah Stroud, “Conceptual Disagreement”

“Conceptual Disagreement”

Can you disagree with someone without thinking that what they say (or think) is false? As we shall see, this is not only possible but (we shall argue) quite frequent. But we will reach this conclusion only via a somewhat winding route. Starting with the type of disagreement most familiar from the philosophical literature, we will progressively expand the circle of genuine disagreement until it encompasses even conceptual disagreement, which one might have thought a contradiction in terms. For conceptual disagreement (as we shall understand it) necessarily involves the parties’ using different concepts, which you might have thought would preclude genuine disagreement. We shall argue otherwise, adducing three different types of case in order to demonstrate the scope of this phenomenon.

Sarah Stroud’s work focuses mainly in contemporary analytic moral philosophy.  Her research interests range widely across this terrain but centre on foundational issues in moral psychology and moral theory and on the intersection of such issues with metaethics and with the philosophy of action.  Current and/or longstanding research interests include:

• lying and testimony
• practical irrationality
• moral demandingness and overridingness
• the ethics of belief
• the moral significance of personal relationships
• the rights and duties of parents and children
• practical knowledge and expertise