Xenophanes' Scepticism

JAMES H. LESHER

Xenophanes of Colophon (fl. 530 B.C.) is thought to have been the first sceptic in the history of western philosophy, but the character of his scepticism was the subject of dispute as early as the fourth century B.C., and the central statement of his position, Fragment 34,1 has been variously interpreted ever since. Much of recent discussion has concerned the severity and scope of his sceptical thesis, but it would be of equal philosophical interest to know what Xenophanes' reasons were for maintaining scepticism, or what features of Xenophanes' life and times may have contributed to his sceptical outlook. It is the contention of this paper that Xenophanes' scepticism is best understood as a response to traditional religious and poetic ways of thinking, and is therefore closely tied to his criticism of Homeric religion, and that the key to a proper understanding of his sceptical remarks lies in an often mentioned but seldom discussed aspect of his writings: the attack on divination.

I — ANCIENT ACCOUNTS

The following extract from Xenophanes' poetry was widely quoted and discussed in antiquity (B 34):

καὶ τὸ μὲν οὐν σαφὲς οὕτως ἀνήρ ἴδεν οὐδὲ τις ἔσται
eidôs ómphi theôn te kai ἄσα λέγω περὶ πάντων
et gêr kai tâ málëstâ tûkoi tételeomêvnon eîpôn,
aûtós ómws oûn oûde' dékôs δ' ëpi pâsê téteútaxal.2

While a full translation requires argument and cannot be assumed at the outset, it is clear that the basic elements of Xenophanes' view are (in some sense of these terms): truth (τὸ σαφὲς), knowing (ἵδεν, εἰδῶς, οὕδε), speaking of the real (τετελεομένων εἶπόν), and belief or seeming (δόκως). Any adequate interpretation of Xenophanes' scepticism, while it can be supplemented by reference to other fragments and background information, must make sense of these notions, and their inter-connections. Sextus mentions two alternative interpretations: in the first,3 Xenophanes is thought to have held that everything is incomprehensible (πᾶντα ἄκατοληπτα), and this is supported by reading σαφὲς as 'true' or 'known'. Yet the true and known — at least in respect of non-evident things — no
human being knows; for even if by chance he should hit upon it, still he knows not that he has hit upon it but imagines and opines. As the context of Sextus’ discussion (VII, 46-52) makes clear, the sceptical dispute concerns not so much the attaining of true belief, but a criterion (κριτήριον) for determining which beliefs are true or which appearances are veridical. Xenophanes is taken here to be denying the existence of a criterion since he holds that even if someone were to say what is real or true, he would not know that he had done so, and hence would have only belief or opinion.

But this interpretation of the fragment is implausible. Not only does it restrict, without justification, the scope of the sceptical thesis to what is ‘non-evident’, but it translates Xenophanes’ simple “he knows not” (οὐχ οἶδε) into “he knows not that he has hit upon it” (οὐχ οἶδεν ὅτι ἐπιβεβληκέναν αὐτῷ), and requires that we attribute to Xenophanes the rather subtle doctrine that knowing the truth entails knowing that one knows the truth, or at least that knowing the truth entails being convinced that what one believes is true. It is doubtful, at least in English, that such entailment holds, but they are not so far fetched as to exclude being attributed to Xenophanes. The difficulty is simply that both are more complex formulations than the original “even if he says what is true, he does not know”. Further, since σωφρός and ἀληθής are not synonyms, Xenophanes’ scepticism could be directed toward ‘certain’, ‘absolute’, or ‘sure’ knowledge, rather than knowledge of the truth simpliciter.

Sextus mentions a second, less sceptical, interpretation of this sort: Xenophanes does not deny all comprehension or apprehension (καταλήψις) of the truth, but only that which is ἐπιστημονική and ἀληθική (Bury: “cognitive and incertant”). Men can apprehend the truth, even if they cannot attain it with certainty — or without reservations (σκοῖγον) — and we can adopt probable reasoning as a criterion for determining what is true (VII, 110). This reading gains some support from Fr. 35: “let these things be believed as resembling the truth (ἑκάστα πάντα ἐκτύμων)”. Yet we must still assume that Xenophanes’ concern was also that of the later sceptics: the existence of a criterion for distinguishing between truth and falsity (or reality and deceptive appearance) and we are also required to attribute to Xenophanes some general notion of apprehension of which knowledge and belief are distinct species. Both interpretations given by Sextus constitute expansions in the language of a later period, and in the context of a dispute of which, for all we know, Xenophanes may have been wholly ignorant. So far we may reasonably conclude only that Xenophanes denies that men have knowledge (or perhaps that men have knowledge of τὸ σωφρὲς) while he allows that men have beliefs which, in some cases, may resemble what is true or real (ἐκτύμων).

Later writers tell us that Xenophanes coupled the distinction between knowledge and mere belief with a contrast between divine and human capacities: god knows the truth, but belief is allotted to men, and Alcmaeon begins his work with a similar remark, perhaps following Xenophanes: “concerning the non-evident, concerning things mortal, the gods have a clear understanding (σωφρήσεως), but men merely conjecture from signs.” As Snell has shown in detail, there was by Xenophanes’ time a well established poetic tradition contrasting divine knowledge and human ignorance, and the attribution of this view to Xenophanes is supported by the frequent, and often disparaging, remarks about the beliefs of mortals (B14: βροτοί, B18, B36: θερατοί), and by his conception of the one God, superior to gods and men, unlike them in body and mind (B23), who moves things by his mind (B25), and who enjoys, in some sense, a whole or complete seeing, thinking and hearing (B24). We have so far no reason to think that B34, taken by itself, reflects this religious context (although I shall argue for this in Section III following), but we can reasonably conclude on the basis of the evidence already cited, that Xenophanes’ scepticism has this feature: as Guthrie puts it, “men could have no certain knowledge, that was reserved for God” (ibid., p.398).

II – RECENT ACCOUNTS

In Karl Popper’s famous “Back to the Pre-Socratics”, Xenophanes is alleged to have held that “all our knowledge is guesswork, yet that we may nevertheless, by searching for that knowledge ‘which is the better’ find it in the course of time.” Popper sees Xenophanes, as did the early Greek sceptics, as an early proponent of his own theory of knowledge: “that knowledge proceeds by way of conjectures and refutations”, and not according to the Baconian myth of induction. Popper concedes that it may sound incredible, but asserts anyway, that there is a clear recognition of this “theory of rational knowledge almost immediately after the practice of critical discussion had begun.” But even conceding for the moment that Xenophanes did think of human understanding as progressing toward but never attaining knowledge of the ‘final truth’, we are still very far from being told that knowledge is obtained not simply from observation and experiment, but from the construction and criticism of theories. According to Diogenes Laertius, Xenophanes held opinions which were opposed to (ἀκριβολόγοι) those of Thales and Pythagoras, and we know that he
criticized the accounts given by Homer and Hesiod. There is no evidence that he held, as Aristotle clearly did hold, that inquiry was best conducted by a review and criticism of previous doctrines and theories. Nor do the remaining fragments reveal that he implicitly followed this principle; apart from one allusion to the Pythagorean doctrine of metempsychosis (B7) and a suggestion that he admired Thales for his ability to predict eclipses (B19), there is no sign that he practiced, much less preached, Popper's principle of 'rational knowledge'.

Yet Popper's account raises an issue that has clear relevance for an interpretation of Xenophanes' scepticism: how can Xenophanes be a proponent of scepticism if he holds also (in B18) that “mortal in time, through seeking, discover what is better (or the better)? Can one consistently deny the possibility of knowledge and at the same time affirm that discovery is possible? Further, as Fränkel asks, how can we consistently think of Xenophanes, “this investigator and portray of reality who took delight in the gathering and contemplation of facts” as one who was also “a sceptic, a tired doubter or a deist but unconvinced dialectician, and that he had no real confidence in the reality of the world of appearances?” (p. 122). Neither of these considerations poses an unavoidable dilemma. Xenophanes does not say, as Popper has it, that men find “that knowledge which is the better”, but only that they discover what is better, and as Guthrie explains, the replacement of divine revelation with human inquiry, which is the full thesis of Fr. 18, may represent Xenophanes' rejection of a primitive 'golden race', and the promotion of a conception of human progress or improvement 'both morally and in the conditions of life' (p. 400). In any event, there is no inconsistency generated by holding that men fall short of certain knowledge, or even knowledge simpliciter, while also conceding that men discover arts, skills, values, or beliefs which are better than previous ones. Similarly, one need not, in order to be justly termed a sceptic, affirm a universal doubt, or a rejection of the evidence of the senses. Fränkel's argument rests on the frequently adopted but mistaken assumption that a sceptic, worthy of the name, must be a pyrrhonian sceptic, that is, must call for a suspension of belief, or perhaps even a rejection of all beliefs as false. There have however been sceptics, as ancient as Carneades and as recent as Keith Lehrer, who deny that we ever know anything, but insist nonetheless that much ought to be believed as true, not the least of which are the beliefs about the world based on the obvious evidence of sense experience. There is no contradiction in asserting that p is true, or ought to be believed, even though p is not something which should be claimed to be known, or known with certainty. Consequently, we cannot hope to show that Xenophanes was not really a sceptic simply on the grounds that one form of scepticism would be incompatible with other aspects of his philosophy.

Fränkel's interpretation is however based largely on linguistic considerations involving B34 itself, and since Fränkel's account is shared, at least in part, by Snell, Guthrie, and Untersteiner, and presents a detailed exegesis, it deserves careful consideration.

Fränkel views B34 as a expression of a 'robust empiricism', and, far from denying the possibility of knowledge, it holds that knowledge which is empirically grounded, based on first-hand observation and experience, can be certain and exhaustive (σοφία). To know, as can be seen in Herodotus' notion of ιστορία, is to have seen, and this close connection of knowing with seeing is borne out by the etymology of οἶδα, literally "I have seen", but commonly simply "I know". Thus Xenophanes is not rejecting knowledge, but only the pretensions to knowledge of one who has not seen things for himself (αὐτῶς οἷος οἶδα). Since we have no first-hand experience of divine attributes and operations, we can have no reliable knowledge of them, but there are plausible suppositions that can be made.

This interpretation makes sense, and we are indebted to Fränkel for his careful rendering of the subtle nuances of many of the terms in the fragment (e.g. τὰ μάλιστα πίσιν) which went un-noticed in earlier commentaries, but his rendering is not without difficulties. Let us assume for the sake of argument that ἵνα in line 1 (καὶ τὸ μὲν οὖν σοφὸς σύνει ἄν ὧν οἶδε τὸ ἡσυχαῖο) does mean seeing, and in particular non-metaphorical seeing -- i.e. visual sense perception, and also that this justifies reading ἵναις in line 2 (ἐνδόει ἀμφί θεῶν τε καὶ ἔσθα λέγει περὶ τῶν τῶν αὐτῶν) as "designating only a knowing rooted in vision" (p. 123). We must then take Xenophanes' thesis to be that 'what is clear or precise (σοφός) no man has ever perceived, nor will there ever be anyone who knows on the basis of empirical observations about the gods and everything else of which I speak'. We can understand why Xenophanes might have held that the gods could not be perceptually known, and hence why it was not possible to have perceptual knowledge about everything of which he spoke, but why should he have thought that no man has ever had perceptual knowledge of what is σοφός, especially if he is willing to allow that sense perception is the source of that knowledge which is certain and exhaustive? The problem is that while the second line discusses knowledge specifically about the gods and everything else of which Xenophanes speaks, the first line is unrestricted: no man has ever seen τὸ σοφὸς. To repair the interpretation, and to over-rule what is the prima facie sense of the passage, we must find some
basis for thinking that Xenophanes wishes to restrict his scepticism to σοφία knowledge of some particular province, and Fränkel maintains that it is the non-evident or supersensible that is the implicit subject throughout. Apart from the suggestion that the preceding context might have already supplied a concrete referent and content for σοφία, the only argument that Fränkel gives is that the "closely resembling postscripts in the quotations by Areius Didymus and Varro give a good indication of the wider context: ‘but God has a genuine knowledge even of transcendent things’" (p. 128). But what these postscripts provide is simply a contrast of divine knowledge with human opinion, and as Guthrie notes, the dichotomy between transcendent and non-transcendent things is "not in the originals" (p. 396n).

A similar difficulty for Fränkel’s interpretation emerges from the generality of Xenophanes’ conclusion in line 4: δοκεῖ δ’ ἐπὶ πάντα τέκτων: belief (or supposition) is allotted to all things. This remark is in odds with Fränkel’s contention that Xenophanes is concerned to deny only knowledge of the supersensible world, and counts as well against thinking that Xenophanes allows for the possibility of knowledge based on sense experience. If Xenophanes meant to deny only knowledge of the supersensible, one would expect him to claim that belief is allotted to these things (and not all things), and if he did think that men could gain reliable knowledge in some manner, one would not expect him to conclude “but belief is allotted to all things”. In short, although lines 2 and 3 might by themselves suggest that Xenophanes’ scepticism was directed only against second-hand ‘knowledge’ of the supersensible world, lines 1 and 4 indicate a general scepticism about the capacity of human beings to see the clear and certain truth, and a willingness to concede only that men can attain true beliefs. Xenophanes was probably not the extreme sceptic that Sotion took him to be, but he still seems more of a sceptic than Fränkel would have us believe.

III – XENOPHANES AND EARLY GREEK RELIGION

We have so far been thinking of Xenophanes as the originator of a cryptic epistemological theory, and have considered that theory through the accounts given by later writers, both ancient and modern. It is however very unlikely, as Charles Kahn has observed, that either of these ways of viewing a pre-Socratic philosopher, will provide a complete picture:

The very possibility of understanding sixty-century ideas, where the documentation is so sadly lacking, depends upon our fuller knowledge of the older poetic outlook. It is only by placing the Milesians in between two regions of light provided by archaic poetry on one hand and classical philosophy on the other – by thus illuminating them, as it were, from above as well as from below – that we may have any hope of seeing a bit deeper into this dark period of transition and creation. It is true that Kahn’s inquiry concerns the origins of Milesian cosmology, and he may not have intended these remarks to apply to other pre-Socratics, but there is ample justification for adopting this approach in our investigation of Xenophanes’ scepticism. Xenophanes was after all a wandering poet who criticized the stories about the gods told by Homer and Hesiod (A1, B11), and testified to the extent of Homer’s influence on common opinion (B10: ἢ ἄρχητο καθ’ Ὑμηρον κεῖτε μεταθέτον πάντας . . .). In what ways might the poetic tradition of Homer and Hesiod have influenced Xenophanes’ thinking, and especially, how might the religious outlook of the older poets link up with his views on human knowledge?

We have already noted that B34 probably embodies, or at least is connected with, a traditional poetic contrast between divine wisdom and human ignorance, but there are other features of Homeric religion which were repudiated by Xenophanes. He rejects the conception of gods in human form (B11, B14) and conceives of one god, greatest among gods and men who is unlike men both in body and mind (B23). One insufficiently appreciated feature of Xenophanes’ critique of religion is his repudiation of religious practices, and not simply religious conceptions. He expresses scorn for the practice of placing pine branches around the house in the belief that these branches are somehow themselves βέσχοι – divine powers (B17), and we are told by Diogenes Laertius that he rebuked (ξαθαπαθεῖα) Epimenides, a man who enjoyed a reputation as a prophet and miracle worker.17 According to Aetius18 and Cicero19 Xenophanes denounced the practice of divination (μαντεία), the attempt to acquire knowledge through the use of omens and portents of various sorts.20 This feature of Xenophanes’ writings, the attack on divination and related superstitious practices, furnishes, I believe, a basis for a coherent account of his general philosophical outlook, and his scepticism. If I am right about this, then we can not only make sense of some troublesome fragments, we can also appreciate the origins of his sceptical outlook, and the significance of the intellectual revolution which was effected by Xenophanes, and by the pre-Socratic philosophers generally.

Xenophanes’ rejection of divination is, first of all, not unconnected with other aspects of his thought. It is a reasonable inference from his conception of god as unlike mortals in raiment, voice, or body, that the gods do not
appear in mortal form, nor do they speak directly to us. Nor, since it is
unfitting for the god to be in different places at different times (B14, 26),
is possible for god to ‘come or go in our midst’ (μετέρχεσθαι in B26). Yet, as
Flacelière states ‘... genuine μανια, in the original sense of the word
(mania: madness) [is] caused by possession, by the literal presence of the god
in the soul of the prophet or prophetess, who thus receives the revelation
direct from heaven.’ Fränkel observes that in the attack on divination,
Xenophanes “made the chasm between the here and the beyond un-
bridgeable” (p. 130), but the chasm had already been provided for in
Xenophanes’ positive account of the one god.

Nor is the attack on divination unconnected with Xenophanes’ cosmo-
logy in which celestial phenomena are explained in terms of water and earth
(B29), or perhaps simply earth (B27). Nilsson’s account of the conflict
between religious and philosophical ways of thinking which was a general
feature of pre-Socratic philosophy, and which led to the diminished in-
fluence of seers and oracles, serves equally well as an explanation of the
connection between Xenophanes’ critique of divination and his cosmo-
logy:

The real clash took place between that part of religion which inter-
fered most in practical life and with which everyone came into contact
every day, namely, the art of foretelling the future, and the attempts of
natural philosophy to give physical explanations of celestial and
atmospheric phenomena, or portents, and other events. Such explana-
tions undermined the belief in the art of the seers and made it
superfluous. For if these phenomena were to be explained in a natural
way, the art of the seers came to naught.21

That Xenophanes’ cosmology had this anti-divinational flavor is indicated
by several isolated remarks about traditional portents, as well as the sub-
jects of his cosmological interest. So far as I know, only Dodds has noticed
the connection: [Xenophanes gives] “naturalistic explanations of the rain-
bow (Fr. 32) and St. Elmo’s fire (A39), both of which are traditional
portents.”22 Rainbows are among the most striking and suggestive of all
natural phenomena, and have been taken as harbingers of good fortune,
but for Xenophanes, “she whom they call Iris, she too is actually a cloud,
purple, and flame red, and yellow to behold” (B32). St. Elmo’s fire, the
freak electrical phenomenon sometimes seen on ships’ masts during
storms, was considered a portent of good fortune, and was thought of in
antiquity as two brothers (Dioscuri, later Cabiri) who were the guardian
saints of mariners in distress,23 but to Xenophanes, “those which some call
the Dioscuri are little clouds glimmering in virtue of the kind of motion

that they have” (A39, Guthrie trans.).

Flacelière presents the following brief summary of the phenomena
which were taken as omens or portents:

Atmospheric phenomena, meteora, were obviously signs of the will of
the gods; especially of Zeus, the god of the atmosphere and the sky.
The weightiest presage of all, the one that could negate or confirm all
others, was thunder. In the Iliad, whenever Zeus wishes to encourage
one of the Greek or Trojan heroes he does so by hurling a thunderbolt
to the right of him. Rain also comes from Zeus, and was regarded as a
sign of his will, a diosemeion. But beyond the clouds and all other
atmospheric phenomena were the stars: in Homer, Sirius, “Orion’s
Dog”, was a star of ill-omen; the Spartans would never embark on a
campaign before the full moon, which appears to be the reason why
they did not arrive at Marathon until the battle was over.24

Among other celestial phenomena thought of as omens or portents were
eclipses, shooting stars, and the phases of the moon. The industrious
mantic seer could find significance in dreams, sneezes, volcanic eruptions,
the sounds of gongs and rustling branches, the entrails of sacrificed
animals, birds, and the casting of dice or bones.25 While the explanations
which Xenophanes gives are neither detailed nor always consistent, they do
focus on many phenomena involved in the practice of divination:

1) “He says that the sun and the stars come from ‘clouds” (A32, Plat.
Strom. 4, cf. A33, 38, 40).

2) “Xenophanes said there are many suns and moons according to
regions, sections, and zones of the earth, and that at a certain time
the disc is banished into some section of the earth not inhabited by
us, and so treading on nothing, as it were, produces the pheno-
menon of an eclipse” (A41a, Aetius, Placita, II, 24, 9).

3) “Eclipses occur by extinction of the sun (σκόπουν ἡλίου) and the sun
is born anew at each of its risings” (A41, Act., II, 24, 4).

4) “The moon disappears each month because it is extinguished”

5) “Comets (κοκτήστας) are groups or motions of burning clouds” (A44,
Aet. III, 2, II).

6) “Lightnings (ὠθοτάτας) take place when clouds shine in motion”
(A45, Aet. III, 3, 6).

7) “The phenomena of the heavens come from the warmth of the sun
as the principle cause. For when the moisture is drawn from the sea,
the sweet water separated by reason of its lightness becomes mist
and passes into clouds, and falls as rain when compressed, and the
Epicurus, whose naturalistic explanations of these phenomena resemble both in content and terminology those given by Xenophanes',
states explicitly what seems to me to be an implicit conclusion of Xenophanes' account:
We are bound to believe that in the sky revolutions, solstices, eclipses, risings and settings, and the like, take place without the ministration or command, either now or in the future, of any being who at the same time enjoys perfect bliss along with immortality.

In short, Xenophanes' cosmology, as well as his conception of the one god, probably served to support his attack on divination through signs. Men personify natural phenomena and think of them as visible signs of the will of the gods, but they are in reality only changes due to the motion of clouds and the kindling and extinction of fires. The true divinity exists elsewhere.

These inter-connections do not, taken in isolation, show that Xenophanes' epistemological remarks have anything to do with the practice of divination but they do suggest that his rejection of divination was not devoid of philosophical importance. Further, since divination is essentially a means for acquiring knowledge we ought at least to consider the possibility (though this has never, to my knowledge, been attempted) that these two aspects of Xenophanes' thought are related in some important way to one another. The crucial question is whether B34 is itself illuminated by drawing attention to the attack on divination, and to the significance attached to divination in the poetic tradition.

We can begin by considering Xenophanes' reason for concluding that no man has seen or known what is σοφός (and that there never will be anyone who knows about the gods and everything else of which he speaks):
εἶ γὰρ καὶ τὰ μάλαστα τῦχοι τετελεσμένοι εἶσώ, αὐτὸς δὲ ἡμῶς οὐκ οἶδα.

As Fränkel has argued, we need not think of τῦχοι (εἰσώ) simply as 'chanced' (to say) or 'accidentally' (said), but rather as 'succeeded' (in saying), or 'correctly' (saying). Thus (taking τὰ μάλαστα as 'especially' or 'more than others') τὰ μάλαστα τῦχοι εἰσώ means 'succeed above others in saying'.

What then can be made of τετελεσμένοι: "for even if someone should succeed above all others in saying what is τετελεσμένοι, still he would not know"? Τετελεσμένοι has been understood as the 'complete truth' or 'what is completely true' (Kirk and Raven, Freeman, Burnet) or simply as 'true' (Guthrie), or 'what is completely true' (Kirk and Raven, Freeman, Burnet) or simply as 'true' (Guthrie), or 'what is really present' (Fränkel), but the literal meaning of τετελεσμένοι, 'what is completed, accomplished, brought about' (from τελέω) has been largely ignored. So far as I can determine, τετελεσμένοι occurs twenty-three times in Homer. In eighteen of these passages, it is linked with speaking or saying, and the following passages illustrate this repeated formulaic expression, "speaking of that which has been brought about or will be brought about" (Murray trans.):

1. "for this will I speak and verily this thing shall be brought to pass" (τὸ δὲ καὶ τετελεσμένον ἔσται), II. I. 212 = II. 257; VIII. 401, VIII. 454; Od. II. 187, XVII. 229, VIII. 82.
2. "He arose and spoke a threatening word, that hath now been brought to pass" (ὁ δὲ τετελεσμένον ἄρει), II. 1. 388.
3. "I will declare to thee as it verily shall be brought to pass" (δὲ καὶ τετελεσμένον ἔσται), II. XXIII. 410 = XVI. 440, XXIII. 672, XIX. 487.
4. "I would that this word of thine might be fulfilled" (ἐπος τετελεσμένον εἰ), Od. XV. 536 = XVII. 163, XIX. 309.

This passage from the Odyssey (XVII. 153 ff.) gives an indication of the sort of context in Homer in which someone speaks of what is τετελεσμένοι:

Then among them spoke also the godlike Theoclymenus, saying:
'Honored wife of Odysseus, son of Laertes, he truly has no clear understanding (οὐ σοφὸς ὤδε), but do thou hearken to my words, for with certain knowledge will I prophesy to thee (ἐπερεᾶσθαι γὰρ σοὶ μαντεύσωμαι), and will hide naught. Be my witness Zeus above all gods, and this hospitable board and the hearth of noble Odysseus to which I come, that verily Odysseus is even now in his native land, resting or moving, learning of these evil deeds, and he is sowing the seeds of evil for all the wooers. So plain a bird of omen did I mark as I sat on the bended ship, and I declared it to Telemachus' [Od. XV. 536].

Then wise Penelope answered him: 'Ah, stranger, I would that this word of thine might be fulfilled (ἐπος τετελεσμένον εἰ).'

These passages, and others in Homer provide ample justification for reading τετελεσμένοι εἰσώ as "speaking or saying what is brought to pass". This fits well in the context of line 3 of B 34, since it is obvious that one kind of thing that one might succeed in saying is a true prediction about future events. One can also connect this with τὰ μάλαστα since some persons might be thought to 'succeed above all others in saying what comes to pass.' The full message of lines 3-4 is that even if one succeeded above others in speaking of what is brought to pass, still he himself does not know, but belief or opinion is allotted to all things.
It is not yet clear whether B 34, in its entirety, espouses a general scepticism or simply scepticism about the claims to knowledge of those who succeed in correctly predicting events, but this latter scepticism is present in lines 3-4 and does serve as the basis for Xenophanes' claim in lines 1-2. Xenophanes' scepticism then involves, at least in part, an implicit repudiation of a central figure in Greek religion, the oracle or prophet, and a repudiation as well of the stature enjoyed by these figures in the Homeric epic. Yet doubts about the infallibility of prophets had already appeared in Homer, and the trustworthiness of divination was a recurrent theme in classical literature. So while Xenophanes' scepticism about divination is revolutionary as a repudiation of the entire enterprise, it is not wholly without precedent.

It should also be noted that the passage quoted at length from Od. XVII, 153 ff. not only links up prophecy with saying what is πεπελεσμένον, but also displays a connection, found elsewhere in Homer, between the gift of prophecy possessed by the mantic seer and 'sure' or 'clear' knowledge (Theoclymenus claims that Telemachus ὁ σάφος ὁ ἔστει, but that he himself will give an exact or certain (δήμεξιόν) prophecy). The form σάφος which appears in line 1 of B 34 does not appear in Homer, but σάφος knowing and σάφος speaking do occur. To say or know in a way which is σάφος is, at the very least, to say or know what is true (cf. II. IV, 404: "Son of Atreus utter not lies (μὴ νεῖδε) when thou knowest how to speak truly (σάφος εἰσεῖν)", but it commonly carries a special emphasis on knowing or saying the full, clear, and detailed truth (cf. Od. XVII, 106: "tell me σάφος of the return of thy father"). On occasion it serves to characterize not what is known but rather the manner in which something is known, and designates a knowing that is sure, certain or expert (cf. II. XV, 632: "unskilled (οὐ σάφος εἶδος) to fight a wild beast"); II. XX 201 = 432: "I know well of myself (σάφος οἶδα καὶ σάφος) how to utter taunts"; II. VII, 226: "Hector, now verily shalt thou know of a surety (σάφος εἶδος) man to man what manner of chieftains there be among the Danaans"). It is such certain knowledge that is claimed by Pulydamas (II. XII, 228 ff.: "on this wise would a soothsayer interpret, one that in his mind had clear knowledge (σάφος φθίγει εἶδον) of omens, and to whom the folk gave ear"). Athene, disguised as Mentes, speaks to Telemachus (Od. I, 200 ff.): I will now prophesy to thee as the immortals put it in my heart, and as I think it shall be brought to pass (τελέσω, though I am in no wise a soothsayer (φθίγω), nor one versed in the signs of birds (οἶων ὁ σάφος εἶδος). Although Athene is not portrayed as claiming to be σάφος εἶδος in such matters (indeed any claim of prophetic wisdom would be at odds with her disguise in purely mortal form), the fact that she claims to be neither a prophet nor one skilled in signs of birds indicates that such skill is typically claimed by the prophet. Thus when Xenophanes asserts in B 34 that no man has seen or known ὁ σάφος it is quite possible that he had in mind a sure or certain knowledge of this sort. Since lines 3-4 concede that someone might succeed in saying what comes to pass, it is unlikely that Xenophanes wishes to deny that men sometimes attain truth. Since these lines serve as Xenophanes' reason (γόρο) for denying that men apprehend what is σάφος, or in a manner which is σάφος, it is likely that he intends to deny that men ever enjoy sure or certain knowledge of the truth, even if they do sometimes succeed in saying it (and can, as in line 4, believe or suppose that it is true).

It is now possible, I believe, to see Xenophanes' remarks as a reflection of, and in part as a reaction against, some basic ways of thinking that were embedded in archaic poetry and religion. While adopting the traditional contrast between human and divine capacities, especially the capacity to know, he rejected the belief that this gulf is bridged by the intervention of divine beings in mortal form, or that the gods somehow speak to men through signs or inspired prophets. Xenophanes' repudiation of divination was probably based on his own positive theology and his de-anthropomorphized cosmology, and is one facet of his attack on the religion of Homer and Hesiod. He denied that men who correctly predict events thereby possess knowledge, and this repudiation of knowledge by divination seems to have led him to adopt a general scepticism about the capacity of mere mortals to attain sure or certain knowledge about the gods and everything else of which Xenophanes speaks.

But there is a remaining problem. The inference is monumentally fallacious: diviners who claim to know the future really do not know, therefore no man has had certain knowledge of the truth nor will there ever be anyone who has knowledge about the gods and everything else of which I speak. How could Xenophanes have reached a general sceptical position simply from the failure of some men to know some things?

IV – THE GROUNDS FOR XENOPHANES’ SCEPTICISM

Since σάφως was thought to be possessed by the gods alone (as in Alcmaeon B1), it might be argued that B 34 does not reject the possibility of all human knowledge, but simply asserts that no man ever enjoys the clear and certain knowledge, possessed by the gods, especially the one god who is greatest above gods and men. If so, then the failure of seers and oracles to gain knowledge even when they speak truly, could be viewed as a reason-
able basis on which to doubt that any man ever shares in the synoptic and certain knowledge of the gods. So the argument is not: since some men don’t know some things, no one knows anything, but rather: since those who could be most expected to share in the knowledge of the gods fail to do so, then no man ever does so (even if they can acquire knowledge by their own inquiry).

This proposal has some merit, but it falls short of being a convincing account, for reasons that became clear in our discussion of earlier attempts to restrict the scope of Xenophanes’ scepticism: while line 1 denies knowledge of what is σηκός, line 2 denies knowledge (without specification of type) of the gods and everything else of which he speaks; line 4 asserts only that belief or seeming is allotted to all things, and B18 does not say that men acquire knowledge through their own seeking. It is simply unreasonale to think that a man who says no man knew or will know with respect to everything, and that belief or seeming is assigned to everything means to say implicitly that some men do know something. The proposal must be rejected. What is useful however in this first attempt to mitigate the fallaciousness of Xenophanes’ inference is its recognition of seers and oracles as paradigms of a sort: they, if anyone, could be expected to share in the knowledge of the gods. To complete the account, we must explain how, in two different respects, Xenophanes argues for a general sceptical thesis on the grounds that since the conditions necessary for knowledge are not met even in the most promising or favorable circumstances, they are never satisfied.

The first paradigm is referred to in line 3 of B34 — even if someone should succeed above others in saying what is brought to pass, still he does not know. What must be remembered is the rather obvious point that the most favorable or promising case that could be made for the art of divination is its track record, i.e. a citation of instances where the predictions made by seers and oracles turned out to be right. This was in fact the kind of ‘proof’ supplied on occasion by those who claim to possess prophetic powers. Thus, although μαντική is not explicitly mentioned in line 3, Xenophanes is challenging what is in fact the most favorable case to be made for knowledge through divination, and claiming that even when someone succeeds in saying truly what comes to pass, he still does not know. His reason for this claim is not stated but as I have already suggested, it is likely tied to his own conception of the gods and his alternative naturalistic explanation of omens and portents of various sorts. Since divination does not supply knowledge, given even the most favorable outcome, it can be reasonably concluded that we cannot acquire know-

edge by means of its techniques.

It should also be noted that while foreknowledge was perhaps the most characteristic claim of the diviner, and successful prediction its strongest support, divination was by no means confined to the future. The most famous seer in Homer, Calchas, is described as “the best of diviners who knows things that were, and were to be, and that had been before” (II, 1, 70). We do not generally know the sorts of questions put to the famous oracles at Delphi and elsewhere, but the leaden tablets excavated at Dodona display a variety of topics on which the oracle was consulted. These include questions about the past and present, as well as the future. Epimenides, who received Xenophanes’ rebuke, is described by Aristotle as one “who did not practise divination about the future, only about the obscurities of the past” (Rhet., 1418 a 21 ff.). Thus, a repudiation of μαντική would result not only in a scepticism about the diviner’s capacity to know the future, but an equal scepticism about their capacity to penetrate the obscurities of the present and past.

But why would it follow from the failure of these men to know anything, that no man has known or will know anything? The answer lies in the status of seers and oracles as paradigm cases, and in the background assumptions about knowledge which were well established in the poetic tradition both preceding and enduring after Xenophanes’ time. Part of this background has been already stated: ‘men could have no certain knowledge, that was reserved for God’. What needs to be added is only, as Guthrie points out, “a commonplace of poetry, expressed in invocations to the muses and elsewhere, that mankind had no sure knowledge unless the gods chose to reveal it.” This conception of knowledge through divine revelation or inspiration is explicit in Homer (e.g. in the introduction to the Catalogue of Ships at II, 448-493: the gods know everything and mortals know nothing unless the gods choose to reveal it) and Hesiod (Theogony, 26 f.), and it occurs in the writings of later philosophers. Parmenides presents his way of truth as a revelation from “the goddess who leads the man who knows through every town” and Parmenides “will learn all things” even though “there is no truth in the beliefs of mortals” (D-K B1). Empedocles also dismisses the claims of mere mortals to have comprehended the truth (D-K B2), but he invokes the muse to lead him on to the heights of wisdom (D-K B3). Not uncharacteristically, Empedocles linked his special insight with the attainment of semi-divine status (D-K B112). In short, given the ‘poetic epistemology’ of Xenophanes’ time, the attainment of certain knowledge requires either an ascent of mortals to the level of the gods or a descent of the gods into human affairs, and Xenophanes denies that either of these
ever occurs. The first of these is made clear by Xenophanes’ refusal to think that someone could be both mortal and immaterial (cf. A13: if they are gods, do not lament for them, if they are men, do not sacrifice to them), and the second possibility is ruled out as “fitting” for the true divinity. If one views certain knowledge as the prerogative of the gods, and makes, as Fränkel puts it, “the chasm between the here and the beyond unbridgeable” (ibid., p. 130), a scepticism concerning human knowledge becomes logically inescapable.

Given these assumptions, B34 becomes clear and coherent: mankind has no certain knowledge unless the gods impart it to us, or some men succeed in attaining the status of the gods. But the gods do not come among us and they do not speak to us either in their own voices or through signs and oracles. Those who might be most thought to enjoy revealed knowledge of the truth do not do so, for even if they succeed above others in saying what comes to pass, still they do not know, and belief is allotted to all things. So the certain truth no man has seen nor will there ever be anyone who has knowledge about the gods and everything else of which I speak.

I have argued that a clear, consistent, and coherent interpretation of Xenophanes’ scepticism can be provided by attending to the religious and poetic tradition in which he stood, and we can now also gain a more realistic appreciation of his achievements. His scepticism is not likely to appeal to contemporary philosophers; it rests on assumptions about knowledge and divine revelation which are no longer widely believed, and it is closely tied to aspects of Homer’s religion which are now mainly of historical interest. Nor can he, without exaggeration, enjoy the status of being an early proponent of the theories of later Greek sceptics or modern philosophical views of the nature and growth of scientific knowledge. There are similarities between his sceptical thesis and the conclusions of the later sceptics, but the grounds for his scepticism are very different from theirs, and there is no good reason to think that he espoused Popper’s ‘principle of rational knowledge’.

What is noteworthy in Xenophanes’ thought is his articulation of the contrast between belief and knowledge, and his contention that whatever truth is to be gained must come as a result of human initiative and inquiry. While he remained too much a traditionalist to think that this could result in certain knowledge, for that was reserved for the gods, he did believe that men could discover what resembled the truth, or what was at least likely to be true. None of this, it seems to me, constitutes the emergence of a ‘robust empiricism’. But Xenophanes’ call for investigation, his repudiation of divination, and his related demythologized cosmology, constitute a departure from earlier ways of thinking that is justly thought of as revolutionary.40

University of Maryland

1 Except where noted to the contrary, the Greek text of the fragments is taken from Diels, Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker, 6th ed. rev. W. Kranz, 3 vols (Berlin 1952). Hereafter cited as D-K. Selections from Xenophanes are cited by number and letter (A: Leben und Lehre, B: Fragmenta).

2 It is quoted by Sextus Empiricus in this form on three occasions (Adv. Math. VII, 49, 110, VIII, 326, and διότι δέ ἐσθι σῶμα τέρτον is quoted at Pyrh. Hyp. II, 18). Plutarch has γένει for ὑδρα in the first line, but this has been rejected in D-K, following Fränkel’s argument in “Xenophanusstudien”, Hermes 60 (1925) since γένει requires a separation of τοῦ αὐτοῦ from ἀπό that is impossible in genuine Archaic style. Further textual sources are listed in Guthrie, A History of Greek Philosophy (Cambridge U. P., 1967), Vol. I, 395. Fränkel’s paper has been translated by M. R. C. Grose and A. P. D. Mourelatos and included in the latter’s The Pre-Socratics: A Collection of Critical Essays (New York, 1974), pp. 118-131. Subsequent references to Fränkel are to this translation of his paper.

3 According to Diogenes Laertius (Lives IX, 20), “Sotion says that he was the first to maintain that all things are incognizable, but Sotus is in error” (Hicks trans.).

4 See for example, Fränkel: “αὐτός unites the notion of completeness . . . with that of reliable, faithful, and unadulterated apprehending” (ibid., p. 127). A fuller discussion appears later in this paper (Section III).


6 D-K 24B1: ἐπί τῶν ὀφασίων, ἐπί τῶν ὑμπαθητων αὐτοῦ, οὐκ θεοὶ ξύνων, ὥστε λαθρεμολογηθῆναι. The text is not certain. While a contrast between divine knowledge and mortal conjecture is clear, it might be read with equal sense, “concerning the non-evident, the gods have a clear understanding, concerning things mortal, men merely conjecture from signs”, or perhaps “concerning things mortal, the gods have a clear understanding, concerning things non-evident, men merely conjecture from signs.”

7 Bruno Snell, The Discovery of the Mind, trans. T. G. Rosenmeyer (Oxford & Boston, 1953), esp. Ch. 7 “Human Knowledge and Divine Knowledge Among the Early Greeks”. See, for example, the prelude to the catalogue of ships in the Iliad: “for you are goddesses, you are at hand and know all things, but we hear only a rumor and know nothing” (485-486); Theognis, Elegiac Poems (141-2): “we men practise vain things, knowing nought, while the gods accomplish all to their mind.” For further examples, see Guthrie, pp. 398-399. This contrast, coupled with a conception of ἀλήθεια as human contrivance, forms the basis for Untersteiner’s view of B34 (cf. Mario Untersteiner, Xenofane (Firenze, 1967), esp. pp. ccix-ccxxi.


9 To make Popper’s thesis even remotely plausible, we must read τετελεσμένον εἰσίν in B34, as ‘saying the final or complete truth’, but (as will be developed in detail later) τετελεσμένον has an ordinary sense of that which is completed, made actual, or brought
about, and perhaps also, following Fränkel, that which is real or present. In neither case can πεπιθετημένον εἶναι be taken as "saying that which is the complete or final explanation or theory."

10 Even so, Aristotle's view is that knowledge is gained not through the refutation of previous conjectures, but, so far as possible, their confirmation. Just prior to the discussion of incommensurate Aristotelian states, "Here as in other cases we must set down the phainomena and begin by considering the difficulties, and so go on to vindicate if possible all the common conceptions about these states of mind, or at any rate most of them and the most important" (NE VII 1 1145 b 2-6). We are indebted to G. E. L. Owen's "Tibenai ta Phainomena" (in Aristote et les problèmes de la méthode, Louvain, 1961) for an appreciation of the extent to which phainomena means not 'the observed facts', but "common conceptions" (ἐπίσκεψις).

11 Ibid., p. 152. Snell (ibid.) also assumes that what men discover is knowledge, and, though he seems not to realize it, this makes his characterization of Xenophanes' doctrine dangerously close to an explicit inconsistency. He attributes the following views to Xenophanes "human knowledge is in its essence deceptive" (p. 139), "only apparent knowledge" (p. 140), "fallacious" (p. 141), and "men acquire knowledge through their own striving (p. 140), "man's own initiative, his industry and zeal, become crucial for the acquisition of knowledge" (p. 140), "knowledge consists of the data gained from inquiry and search" (p. 140). I find his one attempt to reconcile these two positions exceptionally opaque "knowledge as such is obscure, but it is illumined by searching" (p. 140).

12 See for example, Lehrer's "Why Not Scepticism?" Philosophical Forum 2 (1971), 283-98.

13 I do not think we can exclude the possibility of ἔχειν being a kind of 'mental seeing'. Homer had already spoken of 'mental seeing' (ἠθέλην ἐν φρονήσει) and what is ως (clear, certain, true) is more naturally thought of as propositions, accounts, stories, rather than the objects of sense perception.

14 It is at least worth noting that τιδεῖν, although etymologically connected with verbs of seeing, had already by the time of Homer acquired a broader sense in which one could consistently say, I know (οἶδα) even though I have not seen. The following passage is from Βk. XX of the Ἰηνία, 203 ff.

. . . we know (οἶδα) each other's parents and lineage, for we have heard tales told in olden days by mortal men, but with sight of eyes hast thou never seen [known] my parents nor I thine (οἶδε μὴ οἴστε) (Murray trans.).


15 Fränkel's later paraphrase indicates that he does not adhere to his early translation ("and what is precise no man has seen") and adopts the expansion I have suggested: τὸ μὲν οὔτε δόξας δέωςδρας oὐδὲς γνωρίσαι ὑπὸ τοῦ παραπόνω τὸν πρὸς τὸν περὶ: a reliable knowledge with respect to all of the objects spoken of here, particularly concerning the gods, is not possible for men" (p. 128).


17 Plato tells the story of Epimenides' visit to Athens and his prophecy about the Persian invasion (Laws, 642c-e, see also the O. C. D., p. 331). Aristotle also refers to him as a seer at Rhet. 1418 a 21 ff.

18 "Συνοφιάντες καὶ ἑπισκηνοῦσαν άνταρροῦσα τὴν παραπόνον," Ætius, Placita, V, 1, 1 (D-K A52).

19 "Of these — to mention the most ancient — Xenophanes of Colophon, while asserting the existence of gods, was the only one who repudiated divination in its entirety (divinationem funditus sustulit), Cicero, De Divinatione, Falconer trans. (Loeb), I, iii, 5.


21 Nilsson, ibid., 136. Sophocles expresses a scepticism about divination (O.T. 499-512) which closely parallels what I think is Xenophanes' thesis: the gods have perfect knowledge, but there is no sure test (τὸν τῶν ὁρών τὸ σημείον) that a mortal seer (ὁ μάντις) attains knowledge even if he excels others in his skill of interpreting omens (ὁρῶν). Cf. the summary by J. C. Kamerbeek. "The contrast between divine and human knowledge ὑπὲρ — δὲ) explains their scepticism as to the truth of Teiresias' words, based on their faith in Oedipus." (The Plays of Sophocles (Leiden, 1967), p. 120.). The summary statement of 499-512 given above is based on the translation by Richard Jebb, Sophocles, The Plays and Fragments (Amsterdam, 1966).


23 Nilsson, ibid., p. 92, 121.

24 Flacelière, ibid., p. 18.

25 Cf. Flacelière, ibid., "Divination by Signs". Xenophanes is said to have visited Etna and commented on the periodic frequency of volcanic eruptions (Aristotle, De Mirab., 833 a 15). We are also told, though the reason is not given, that Xenophanes disapproved of dice (A16). These fragments are however not obviously related to his attack on divination.

26 Epicurus' naturalistic explanations of celestial phenomena consistently follow those given by Xenophanes, though he is not mentioned by name: "the rising and setting of the sun, moon, and stars may be due to kindling and quenching (διακοπή καὶ σχέδεω)"; or it may be due to "their coming forward above the earth or by its intervention"; eclipse of the sun may be due to the quenching of its light (ναότο σχέδεω), lightning may be due to the motion of atoms in the clouds; comets are due to fires in the heavens, etc. (Diogenes Laercius, Lives, X, 91-93, 96-98, 101, 111). While Epicurus conceives that the facts allow for a plurality of explanations, he insists that the exclusion of myth is a necessary condition (μονὸς δὲ τῶν ἐκπεστένων ἐκποριστικῶν) for understanding and peace of mind (103).

27 Letter to Herodotus in Diogenes Laercius, Lives, X, 76. Following Epicurus, Lucretius attacks rigorous superstition on the basis of alternative physical explanations of the motions of heavenly bodies, eclipses, lightning, clouds, rain, volcanic eruptions, the seasons, plagues, rainbows, etc. (De Rerum Natura, V, VI).

28 Fränkel, ibid., p. 126.

29 At one point Fränkel translates τετελεσμένον εἶναι as "saying something which turns out to be true", but he later discards this in favor of 'articulating what is really present' (ibid., 126-127). Guthrie (ibid., 395, n. 4) characterizes τετελεσμένον as 'a typically Homeric word' but does not indicate what it typically means in Homer.

30 Cf. R. J. C. Culliffo, A Lexicon of the Homeric Dialect (1924), 337: A great many more
examples could be provided by broadening the criterion to include variant verbs for speaking (e.g. ἠφεσέως — to speak publicly) and other forms of πελάκω (e.g. the prediction of Calchas at Ἡ Ἰ, 330).

32 Cited the predictions of Melanthius (Od. XVII, 299), Antinous (Od. XVIII, 82), Odysseus (Od. XIX, 547).

33 See and oracles are of course the paradigm cases, but the description could refer to anyone who succeeds in correctly predicting the future. According to Diogenes Laertius (Lives, I, 23) Xenophanes admired Thales for his ability to predict eclipses and set the solstices. B. L. van der Waarden (following an explanation given by M. Schramm) accounts for Thales’ prediction by pointing out that Thales predicted only that an eclipse would occur in a certain year (Herodotus, I, 74) and, given enough background information about preceding lunar and solar eclipses, it was possible to discover that in some years solar eclipses were likely to occur (Science Awakening: The Birth of Astronomy (New York, 1974), pp. 120-122). Xenophanes’ admiration for Thales’ ability (assuming the accuracy of the story) need not be at odds with his skepticism about divination, since he may have credited Thales with ‘skill in conjecture’, not knowledge. Euripides adopts this position when he says that “the good prophet is the man skilled in conjecture” (Hec., 744-757), Plato credits the oracles and prophets with ‘well-aimed conjecture’ (ἐπιάσμα) but insists that this is only true opinion, not knowledge (Meno, 99c).

34 In Book II of the Odyssey, Eurymachas tells the prophet Hialiheres to go home and prophesy to his children, for “many are the birds who under the sun’s rays wander, not all of them mean anything” (181-2), “Nor do we care for any prophecy (θεοπροφετήσεως), which you, old sir, tell us, which will not happen, and will make you even more hated” (μὴ ἐνέπνεουσα τοιαύτης προφετήσεως ἐν ἑκάστῳ, 202). See also Hec. Scorn for the prophecy from birds given by Pylades (I, II, 228ff.: “one bird only is best, one omen— to fight for our country”). Aristophanes was later to ridicule the soothsayers in The Knights and The Birds. Sophocles’ Oedipus Rex contains occasional sceptical remarks about the reliability and legitimacy of prophecy (lines 500-515) but since Teiresias’ predication is ultimately confirmed, one cannot believe Sophocles’ intention was to undermine confidence in divination. Divination was not repudiated by either Plato or Aristotle, at least not in all its forms, and it was defended by the Stoics. The most extensive criticism among later philosophers was provided by the Epicureans, as can be seen in the remarks of the Epicurean Beothus in Platarch’s dialogue On the Pythian Oracles which the Sibyls and Baksis have foretold every sort of event and misfortune: if it so happens that a number of them have come to pass, nonetheless at the time they were uttered their prophecies were lies, even if forlorn circumstances should eventually appear to make them true.” Quoted in Place, ibid., p. 81.

35 So characteristic in fact that it becomes natural to speak of the prophets themselves as σαφές — sure or unerring (cf. Liddell and Scott: σαφής; for example, the description of Teiresias in Sophocles’ Oed. Rex, 286: σαφήνετά). The syntax of ἡσύς (direct object of ἠσύς, accusative of respect, or adverbial accusative) is unclear, but I do not see that a reasonable interpretation of the fragment presupposes a definitive answer. What is ἡσύς may be what is not known, or it may be the respect in which one does not know, or the manner in which one does not know. The important point is that ἡσύς, ἐσύς and ἕσως in lines 1-2 are set in clear contrast (μὴν ἐσώστε) with ἕσως in line 4. Denniston cites this fragment as an example of an σύν (in τὸ μὲν σύν σαφές) emphasizing a prospective μὲν (The Greek Particles (Oxford at the Clarendon Press, 1954), p. 473). This contrast makes it unlikely that τὸ σαφές functions as an independent sentence as, for example in Cleve’s: “and this is sure by all means” (The Giants of Pre- Sophistic Philosophy, p. 28).

36 The great importance of seers and oracles in both public and private affairs is perhaps sufficiently well known to need no further argument. One need only point to the great popularity of the traditional oracles at Delphi, Dodona, and Clarus (near Colophon), and according to Herodotus, the incessant use made of seers in military matters as the clearest evidence of the exalted position which they enjoyed. The major role played by diviners in Greek religion is explained in detail by Nilson, ibid., 123-139.

37 In Book II of the Odyssey, Halihtires predicts the fate that is to befall Penelope’s suitors, and then argues:

“A Masquiini contro a vò, O me kai kósmos, and the time the Argives took ship for Ilium, and with them went resourceful Odysseus. I said that after much suffering, with all his companions lost, in the twentieth nay, not recognized by any, he would come home. And now all this is being accomplished (καὶ τῷ χῶρῳ τῆς ἁλίξτης, 170-176, Lattimore trans.).

A similar defense is offered by Euthyphro, the self-proclaimed theological expert in Plato’s Euthyphro (3c), when he complains of his reception in the assembly: “When I tell them in advance what will occur they laugh at me, and yet I have never made a prediction that did not come true.”

38 Included among those questions recorded were these: whether a man’s wife will bear him a child, whether the child which his wife is carrying is actually his, whether a man will do well by breeding sheep, and, my favorite, “Agis asks Zeus Naio and Dione whether he lost the blankets and pillows himself or whether they were stolen by someone outside the household.” For other examples see C. Cararones, Dodone et ses ruines (Paris, 1878) 80 ff., and the Bulletin de Corr. Hell., 83 (1959) 669-73.

39 Ibid., p. 398. It has been thought that Xenophanes rejected the view that mortals derive knowledge from the gods, and held instead that men gain knowledge through their own inquiry (Snell, ibid., 139-144; John Robinson, An Introduction to Eastern Greek Philosophy New York, 1968, pp. 35-56). But this is not implied by the fragment. Xenophanes denies that the gods revealed all things to mortals from the beginning and he repudiates divination, but he nowhere rejects the assumption that if knowledge is to be attained at all by mortals, it must come by divine revelation. What man can discover through seeking is ‘the better’ (B15) which can easily be the δόσις of B34, and which may resemble or be similar to what is true (B35). One relevant fragment on this issue is the tantalizingly brief B36: δόσις δ' ἐν ἑκάστῳ τῶν σαφέως καταφέροντας, “as many as they have revealed to mortals to look upon.” But it does not say anything about knowledge. The major obstacle in the path of thinking that Xenophanes espouses knowledge gained ugh inquiry is one of consistency. Like Snell, Robinson seems untroubled by attributing to Xenophanes the following: “only through patient inquiry does the truth come to be known” and “the truth itself is known only to god” (ibid., p. 56).

40 I am indebted to William Forthenbaug, David Glidden, G. B. Kerferd, David Konstan, Martha Nussbaum, and Gregory Vlastos for their criticism of earlier drafts of this paper. I would also like to thank A. P. D. Mourelatos, Carl Brumbach, William Sewell, and Ronald Swigger for their assistance during the early stages of my research on this topic.