He is interested in rationality — what it is rational to believe, to do, and to care about.
Parity, Prospects, and Predominance. (2019) Philosophical Studies, 176(4), 1077-1095. [link] [preprint] [abstract]
If There Are No Diachronic Norms of Rationality, Why Does It Seem Like There Are? (2019) Res Philosophica (special issue on Reasons and Rationality), 96(2), 141-173. [link] [preprint] [abstract]
Opaque Sweetening and Transitivity. Forthcoming in Australasian Journal of Philosophy. [link] [preprint] [abstract]
The Sunk Cost ‘Fallacy’ is Not a Fallacy [pdf] [abstract]
Lying, Misleading, and Plausible Deniability [pdf] [abstract]
Risk-taking and Tie-breaking [pdf] [abstract]
Doing Your Best (While Making Do With Less): The Actual Value Conception of Instrumental Rationality[pdf] [abstract]