

Curriculum Vitae

Ram Neta

Dept. of Philosophy
CB #3125, Caldwell Hall University of
North Carolina, Chapel Hill Chapel Hill,
NC 27599-3125
Phone: 919-962-3321
neta@email.unc.edu

Employment:

Professor of Philosophy, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, 2013 – present.
Associate Professor of Philosophy, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, 2008 – 2013.
Assistant Professor of Philosophy, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, 2003 – 2008.
Assistant Professor of Philosophy, University of Utah, 1998 – 2003.
Visiting Instructor, Department of Philosophy, Carnegie Mellon University, 1995 - 97.

Education:

University of Pittsburgh, Ph.D., philosophy, 1997.
Harvard University, A.B., philosophy, 1988.

Awards:

UNC-Chapel Hill Center for Faculty Excellence 100+ Course Grant, 2015
UNC-Chapel Hill Institute for Arts and Humanities Academic Excellence Award, 2015
UNC-Chapel Hill University Research Council Award, 2007
UNC-Chapel Hill Junior Faculty Development Award, 2005
UNC-Chapel Hill College of Arts and Sciences Spray-Randleigh Faculty Fellowship, 2003
University of Utah Faculty Fellowship, 2000
Participant in NEH Summer Seminar “Moore and Wittgenstein on Certainty”, UCSD, 1998
Southwestern Philosophical Society prize for “How can there be semantic facts?”, 1997
National Science Foundation Graduate Fellowship, 1990-1993

Edited Volumes:

Philosophical Issues: A Supplement to Nous, Volume 25: Normativity, Blackwell (2015)
Current Controversies in Epistemology, Routledge (2013)
Epistemology: Volumes 1 - 4, Routledge (2012)
Thinking Independently: An Introduction to Philosophy, Cognella (2010, revised edition 2012)
Arguing about Knowledge, co-edited with Duncan Pritchard, Routledge (2009)

Research Articles:

“The Basing Relation and Following a Rule” in *Well Founded Belief: New Essays on the Epistemic Basing Relation*, edited by Pat Bondy and J. Adam Carter (Routledge, forthcoming).

“What Makes Inference a Form of Agency?” *Philosophical Issues: A Supplement to Nous* (forthcoming)

“An argument for Disjunctivism by appeal to Phenomenological Differences” in *Disjunctivism*, edited by Casey Doyle, Joseph Milburn, and Duncan Pritchard (Routledge, forthcoming).

- “How Do You Know What Inferences You Make?” in *Inference and Consciousness*, edited by Timothy Chan and Anders Nes (Routledge, forthcoming).
- “An Evidentialist Account of Hinge Propositions,” *Synthese* (forthcoming).
- “Evidence, Coherence, and Epistemic Akrasia,” *Episteme* (forthcoming).
- “Two Legacies of Goldman’s Epistemology,” *Philosophical Topics* (forthcoming).
- “Why Must Evidence Be True?” in *The Factive Turn in Epistemology*, edited by Velislava Mitova (Cambridge University Press, forthcoming).
- “The Motivating Power of the A Priori Obvious” in *Moral Rationalisms*, edited by Francois Schroeter and Karen Jones (Oxford University Press, forthcoming).
- “Access Internalism and the Guidance Deontological Conception of Justification”, *American Philosophical Quarterly* 53 (2016): 155 – 67.
- “Coherence and Deontology”, *Philosophical Perspectives: Epistemology*, edited by John Hawthorne and Jason Turner (2016): 284 – 304.
- “Perceptual Evidence and the Capacity View”, *Philosophical Studies* 173 (2016): 907 – 14.
- “How Holy is the Disjunctivist Grail?”, *Journal of Philosophical Research* 41 (2016): 193 – 200.
- “Epistemic Circularity and Virtuous Coherence” in *The Present and Future of Virtue Epistemology*, edited by Miguel Fernandez (Oxford University Press, 2016): 224 – 48.
- “Chalmers’s Frontloading Argument for A Priori Scrutability”, *Analysis* 74 (2014): 651 – 61.
- “The Epistemic ‘Ought’” in *Naturalizing Epistemic Virtue*, edited by Abrol Fairweather and Owen Flanagan (Cambridge University Press, 2014): 36 – 52.
- “Klein’s Case for Informatism” in *Ad Infinitum: New Essays on Epistemological Informatism*, edited by Peter Klein and John Turri (Oxford University Press, 2014): 143 – 61.
- “What is an Inference?” in *Philosophical Issues: A Supplement to Nous* 23 (2013): 388 – 407.
- “Easy Knowledge, Transmission Failure, and Empiricism”, *Oxford Studies in Epistemology* 4 (2013): 166 – 84.
- “The Case Against Purity”, *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 85 (2012): 456 – 64.
- “Knowing from the Armchair that Our Intuitions are Reliable”, *The Monist* 95 (2012): 332 – 54.
- “Quine, Goldman, and Two Ways of Naturalizing Epistemology” in *Epistemology: The Key Thinkers*, edited by Stephen Hetherington (Continuum, 2012): 193 – 213.
- “The Nature and Reach of Privileged Access” in *Self-Knowledge*, edited by Anthony Hatzimoysis (Oxford University Press, 2011): 9 – 32.
- “Reflections on Reflective Knowledge”, *Philosophical Studies* 153 (2011): 3- 17.
- “A Refutation of Cartesian Fallibilism”, *Nous* 45 (2011): 658 – 95.
- “Can A Priori Entitlement be Preserved by Testimony?” in *Social Epistemology*, edited by Adrian

- Haddock, Alan Millar, and Duncan Pritchard (Oxford University Press, 2010): 194 – 215.
- “Should We Swap Internal Foundations for Virtues?”, *Critica* **42** (2010): 43 – 56.
- “Liberalism and Conservatism in the Epistemology of Perceptual Belief”, *Australasian Journal of Philosophy* **88** (2010): 685 - 705.
- “Human Knowledge as a Standing in the Space of Reasons”, *Philosophical Topics* **37** (2009): 115 – 32.
- “Defeating the Dogma of Defeasibility” in *Williamson on Knowledge*, edited by Patrick Greenough and Duncan Pritchard (Oxford University Press, 2009): 161 – 82.
- “Treating Something as a Reason for Action”, *Nous* **43** (2009): 684 – 99.
- “Empiricism about Experience”, *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* **79** (2009): 482 – 9.
- “Undermining the Case for Contrastivism”, *Social Epistemology* **22** (2008): 289 – 304.
- “How Cheap Can You Get?”, *Philosophical Issues: A Supplement to Nous* **18** (2008): 130 – 142.
- “How to Naturalize Epistemology” in *New Waves in Epistemology*, edited by Duncan Pritchard and Victor Hendricks (Palgrave Macmillan, 2008): 324 – 53.
- “What Evidence Do You Have?”, *British Journal for Philosophy of Science* **59** (2008): 89 – 119.
Reprinted in *Epistemology*, volume 3, edited by Ram Neta (Routledge: London, 2012).
- “In Defense of Disjunctivism” in *Disjunctivism: Perception, Action, Knowledge*, edited by Fiona MacPherson and Adrian Haddock (Oxford University Press, 2008): 311 – 29.
- “Fixing the Transmission: The New Mooreans” in *Themes from G.E. Moore: New Essays in Epistemology and Ethics*, edited by Susana I. Nuccetelli and Gary Seay (Oxford University Press, 2007): 62 – 83.
- “Safety and Epistemic Luck” (with Avram Hiller), *Synthese* **158** (2007): 303 – 13.
- “In Defense of Epistemic Relativism”, *Episteme* **4** (2007): 30 – 48.
- “Anti-Intellectualism and the Knowledge-Action Principle”, *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* **75** (2007): 180 – 7.
- “Propositional Justification, Evidence, and the Cost of Error”, *Philosophical Issues: A Supplement to Nous* **17** (2007): 197 – 216.
- “McDowell and the New Evil Genius” (with Duncan Pritchard), *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* **74** (2007): 381 – 96.
- “Reply to Gallimore”, *Philosophical Studies* **134** (2007): 71 – 2.
- “Contextualism and a Puzzle about Seeing”, *Philosophical Studies* **134** (2007): 53 – 63.
- “Epistemology Factualized: New Contractarian Foundations for Epistemology”, *Synthese* **150** (2006): 247 – 280.
- “A Contextualist Solution to the Problem of Easy Knowledge”, *Grazer Philosophische Studien* **69** (2005): 63 – 85.

“Luminosity and the Safety of Knowledge” (with Guy Rohrbaugh), *Pacific Philosophical Quarterly* **85** (2004): 396 – 406.

“The Normative Significance of Brute Facts”, *Legal Theory* **10** (2004): 199 – 214.

Reprinted in *Law: Metaphysics, Meaning, and Objectivity*, edited by Enrique Villanueva (Rodopi: Amsterdam and New York, 2007): 75-94.

“Skepticism, Abductivism, and the Explanatory Gap”, *Philosophical Issues: A Supplement to Nous* **14** (2004): 296 – 325.

“Perceptual Evidence and the New Dogmatism”, *Philosophical Studies* **119** (2004): 199 – 214.

“Skepticism, Contextualism, and Semantic Self-Knowledge”, *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* **67** (2003): 396 – 411.

“Contextualism and the Problem of the External World”, *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* **66** (2003): 1 – 31.

“S knows that p”, *Nous* **36** (2002): 663 – 681.

“How can there be semantic facts?”, *Southwest Philosophy Review* **14** (1998): 25 – 30.

“Stroud and Moore on skepticism”, *Southwest Philosophy Review* **13** (1997): 83 - 89.

Entries in Reference Works:

“Skepticism about the External World” in *Skepticism: From Antiquity to the Present*, edited by Diego Manchuca and Baron Reed (Bloomsbury, 2017).

“Philosophy of Language for Epistemology” in *Routledge Companion to the Philosophy of Language*, edited by Delia Graff Fara and Gillian Russell (Routledge, 2012): 693 – 704.

“The Basing Relation” in *Routledge Companion to Epistemology*, edited by Sven Bernecker and Duncan Pritchard (Routledge, 2010): 109 – 18.

“Causal Theories of Knowledge and Perception” in *Oxford Handbook of Causation*, edited by Helen Beebe and Peter Menzies (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009): 592 – 606.

“Contextualism” in *The Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, 2nd Edition, edited by Donald Borcherdt (Detroit: MacMillan Reference USA, 2006).

Book Reviews:

Review of Miriam McCormick, *Believing Against the Evidence* (Routledge, 2015) *Mind* **499** (2016): 942 – 5.

Review of Ernest Sosa, *Judgment and Agency* (Oxford University Press, 2015) *Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews* (December, 2015)

Review of Jason Stanley, *Knowledge and Practical Interests* (Oxford University Press, 2005), *The Philosophical Review* **121** (2012): 298 – 301.

Review of Jeremy Fantl and Matthew McGrath, *Knowledge in an Uncertain World* (Oxford University Press, 2009), *The Philosophical Quarterly* **62** (2011): 211 – 5.

Review of Ernest Sosa, *A Virtue Epistemology* (Oxford University Press, 2007), *Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews* (May, 2008)

Review of David Finkelstein, *Expression and the Inner* (Harvard University Press, 2003), *The Philosophical Review* **117** (2008): 310 – 3.

Review of *Naturalism in Question*, eds. De Caro and Macarthur (Harvard University Press, 2004), *The Philosophical Review* **116** (2007): 657 – 63.

Review of Christopher Peacocke, *The Realm of Reason* (Oxford University Press, 2003), *Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews* (October, 2004)

Presentations:

“Access Internalism and Rational Dilemmas”, presented to
UNC-KCL Conference on Reasons (Chapel Hill, NC) June 2017
Edinburgh Epistemology Conference (Edinburgh, UK) June 2017
Episteme Conference (Galapagos Islands, Ecuador) July 2017

“Moral Deference and the Stability of Moral Belief” (with Joshua Blanchard), presented at Auburn University (Auburn, AL) March 2017

“It’s a priori that it’s a posteriori that you’re not a brain in a vat”, presented to University of British Columbia (Vancouver, BC) February 2017
University of Sorbonne (Paris, FR) January 2017
University of Pittsburgh Disjunctivism Workshop (Pittsburgh, PA) April 2016

“Basing and Conjuring”, presented to
University of Pennsylvania (Philadelphia, PA) November 2016
University of North Carolina (Chapel Hill, NC) March 2016
Normativity of Attitudes Conference at Saarland University (Saarbrücken, Germany) November 2015
Online Brains Conference (Tallahassee, FL) September 2015

“Basing and Treating”, presented to
Conference on Epistemic Normativity (Helsinki, Finland) August 2015
Rutgers Epistemology Conference (New Brunswick, NJ) May 2015
Pacific Division Meeting of the APA (Vancouver, BC) April 2015

“Coherence as a Condition of Rationality”, presented to
20th Annual Meeting of SOFIA (Huatulco, MX) January 2015
The Philosophy Department at the University of Alabama (Tuscaloosa, AL) November 2014

“Hypothetical Cases, and the Program of Negative X-Phi”, presented to
Eastern Division Meeting of the APA (Baltimore, MD), December 2013

“Knowledge and Reasons”, presented as keynote address to Calgary Graduate Philosophy Conference (Calgary, AB) March 2013

“What is an Inference?”, presented to
The Philosophy Department at the University of Nebraska (Lincoln, NE) April 2014
The Philosophy Department at the University of Colorado (Boulder, CO) February 2014
The Philosophy Department at Princeton University (Princeton, NJ) February 2014
The Philosophy Department at Stanford University (Palo Alto, CA) December 2013
The Philosophy Department at the University of Geneva (Geneva, Switzerland) April 2013
The Philosophy Department at Oberlin College (Oberlin, OH) February 2013
The Philosophy Department at the University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill (Chapel Hill, NC)

November 2012

“Does the Epistemic ‘Ought’ Imply the Cognitive ‘Can’?”, presented to
The Philosophy Department at McMaster University (Hamilton, ON) September 2012
The Philosophy Department at the University of Guelph (Guelph, ON) September 2012
The Arche Center at the University of St. Andrews (St. Andrews, UK) May 2012
The UNC/King’s College, London Epistemology Conference (London, UK) May 2012
The Philosophy Department at the University of Edinburgh (Edinburgh, UK) May 2012
The Northwestern/Notre Dame Philosophy Conference (Chicago, IL) April 2012
Central Division Meeting of the APA (Chicago, IL) April 2012

“Easy Knowledge, Transmission Failure, and Empiricism”, presented to
The Philosophy Department at the University of Pittsburgh (Pittsburgh, PA) November 2011
The Philosophy Department at Fordham University (New York, NY) November 2011
The Philosophy Department at the University of Richmond (Richmond, VA) November 2011

“Easy Knowledge and Reliabilism”, presented to
Pacific Division Meeting of the APA (San Diego, CA) April 2011

“Knowing from the Armchair that Our Intuitions are Reliable”, presented to
NEH Summer Seminar on Experimental Epistemology (Tucson, AZ) July 2012
Workshop on Experimental Epistemology (San Diego, CA) April 2011

“Sosa on Basic Knowledge and Easy Knowledge”, presented to
The Virtue Epistemology Conference at UNAM (Mexico City, Mexico) January 2011

“Knowledge, Safety and the State of Nature”, presented to
The Arche Center at the University of St. Andrews (St. Andrews, UK) May 2010
Conference on Cognitive Ethology at the University of Edinburgh (Edinburgh, UK) May 2010

“Easy Knowledge, Bootstrapping, and Higher-Order Reasons”, presented to
Arche Conference on Evidence (St. Andrews, UK) May 2010
The Philosophy Department at the University of Vermont (Burlington, VT) April 2010

“Evidence that Stakes Don’t Matter to Evidence”, presented (with Mark Phelan) at the Experimental
Epistemology Workshop at the University of Buffalo (Buffalo, NY) October 2009

“Defending the Purity of Knowledge: A Reply to Fantl and McGrath”, presented at the Arche
Conference on Contextualism (St. Andrews, UK) May 2009

“Liberalism, Conservatism, Mooreanism, and Rationalism”, presented at the Conference on the
Epistemology of Perceptual Judgment at Brown University (Providence, RI) February 2009

“Epistemic Possibility: In Defense of Contextualism”, presented to
Pacific Division Meeting of the APA (Pasadena, CA) March 2008

“Knowledge and the Space of Reasons, presented to
AHRC workshop on basic knowledge (Edinburgh, UK) May 2008
AHRC conference at the University of Stirling (Stirling, UK) November 2007

“Coherence”, presented to
The Philosophy Department at the University of Texas (Austin, TX) August 2008
The Philosophy Department at St. Andrews University (St. Andrews, UK) May 2008
Cambridge Moral Sciences Club at University of Cambridge (Cambridge, UK) May 2008
The Philosophy Department at Harvard University (Cambridge, MA) April 2008
The Philosophy Department at the Johns Hopkins University (Baltimore, MD) October 2007

“Coherence, the Preface, and the Lottery”, presented to
The Bled Epistemology Conference (Bled, Slovenia) May 2007
The Philosophy Department at the University of Aberdeen (Aberdeen, UK) May 2007
The Philosophy Department at the University of Edinburgh (Edinburgh, UK) May 2007
The Philosophy Department at Virginia Commonwealth University (Richmond, VA) March 2007

“Defending Access Internalism”, presented at Pacific Division Meeting of the APA (Portland, OR)
March 2006

“Defeating the Dogma of Defeasibility”, presented to
The Philosophy Department at the University of Michigan (Ann Arbor, MI) February 2006
The Philosophy Department at the University of North Carolina – Chapel Hill (Chapel Hill, NC)
December 2005

“Fixing the Transmission: The New Mooreans”, presented to
Graduate Seminar at Brown University (Providence, RI) February 2006
The Philosophy Department at the Australian National University (Canberra, Australia) November
2005
The Philosophy Department at the University of Melbourne (Melbourne, Australia) October 2005

“In Defense of Disjunctivism”, presented at the Conference on Disjunctivism at the University of
Glasgow (Glasgow, UK) June 2005

“What Makes for Epistemic Excellence?”, presented at Central Division Meeting of the APA
(Chicago, IL) April 2005

“An Internalist Refutation of Fallibilism”, presented to
The Philosophy Department at Monash University (Melbourne, Australia) October 2005
The Philosophy Department at East Carolina University (Greenville, NC) April 2005
The Philosophy Department at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (Cambridge, MA) March
2005

“Undermining the Case for Contrastivism”, presented at the Conference on Contrastivism at the
University of Aarhus (Aarhus, Denmark) February 2005

“The Indefeasibility of Knowledge and Rational Belief”, presented to Southern Society for
Philosophy and Psychology Meeting (New Orleans, LA) April 2004

“Skepticism, Contextualism, and a Puzzle about Seeing”, presented to
Semantics/Pragmatics Workshop at the University of Virginia (Charlottesville, VA) May 2004
Inland Northwest Philosophy Conference (Pullman, WA and Moscow, ID) May 2004
Epistemology Conference at the University of North Carolina, Greensboro (Greensboro, NC) March
2004

“The Normative Significance of Brute Facts”, presented to the Conference on Legal Philosophy at
the Universidad Nacional Autonoma de Mexico (University City, Mexico) July 2003

“Why Should We Trust Our Senses?”, presented to
Graduate Seminar on Concepts at Princeton University (Princeton, NJ) April 2003
The Philosophy Department of the University of Florida (Gainesville, FL) April 2003

“Luminosity and the Safety of Knowledge” (with Guy Rohrbaugh), presented at Pacific Division
Meeting of the APA (San Francisco, CA) March 2003

“Why Should We Trust Appearances?”, presented at North Carolina Philosophical Society Meeting (Charlotte, NC) February 2003

“Basic Knowledge and Easy Knowledge”, presented to the Philosophy Department at Auburn University (Auburn, AL) December 2002

“Perceptual Evidence and the New Dogmatism”, presented at the conference “Contextualism in Epistemology and Beyond”, hosted by the Philosophy Department of the University of Massachusetts (Amherst, MA) October 2002

“How Experience Teaches”, presented to the Philosophy Department of the University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill (Chapel Hill, NC) August 2002

“Abductive Solutions to Cartesian Skepticism”, presented at Pacific Division APA Meeting of Society for Skeptical Studies (Seattle, WA) March 2002

“What is Perception?”, presented to the Philosophy Department of the University of Utah (Salt Lake City, UT) April 2002
Philosophy Department of York University (Toronto, Ontario) February 2002

“The Possibility of a Feminist Epistemology”, presented at a Rosenblatt lunch meeting of the Philosophy Department of the University of Utah (Salt Lake City, UT) January 2002

“Abductive Solutions to Cartesian Skepticism”, presented to the Philosophy Department of the University of Hong Kong (Hong Kong, China) November 2001
Philosophy Department of Lingnan University (Hong Kong, China) November 2001

“Skepticism, Contextualism, and Semantic Self-Knowledge”, presented to the Philosophy Department of the University of Massachusetts (Amherst, MA) April 2001

“Wittgenstein on skepticism and common sense”, presented to the Philosophy Department of Hamilton College (Clinton, NY) April 2001

“Skepticism, Contextualism, and Semantic Tracking” presented at Pacific Division APA Meeting of Society for Skeptical Studies (San Francisco, CA) March 2001
Mid-South Philosophy Conference (Memphis, TN) February 2001

“How to raise and lower the veil of ideas”, presented at the conference “Skepticism and Interpretation”, hosted by the Amsterdam School for Cultural Analysis, Theory and Interpretation (ASCA) at the University of Amsterdam (Amsterdam, The Netherlands) June 2000

“How to raise and lower the veil of ideas”, presented to Ockham Society at the University of Oxford (Oxford, UK) October 2000
Philosophy Department of University College, London (London, UK) October 2000
Philosophy Department of the University of Reading (Reading, UK) October 2000
Philosophy Department of the University of British Columbia (Vancouver, BC) March 2000
Philosophy Department of the University of Utah (Salt Lake City, UT) February 1998
Department of Philosophy & Religion of Colgate University (Hamilton, NY) February 1998
Philosophy Department of the College of New Jersey (Trenton, NJ) January 1998

“S knows that p” presented to Philosophy Department of the University of Southampton (Southampton, UK) October 2000

“How to be an infallibilist”, presented at Eastern Divisional Meeting of the APA (Boston, MA) December 1999, and

North Texas Philosophical Association Meeting (Dallas, TX) March 1999

“Does the theory of knowledge rest on a mistake?”, presented to
Philosophy Department of the University of Utah (Salt Lake City, UT) January 2000
Philosophy Department of Auburn University (Auburn, AL) November 1999

“Rieber on Skepticism”, presented at
Mid-South Philosophy Conference (Memphis, TN) February 2000
Central States Philosophy Conference (Norman, OK) October 1999

“Skepticism and the first person”, presented at Mid-South Philosophy Conference (Memphis, TN)
March 1999

“How can there be semantic facts?”, presented at Southwestern Philosophical Society Annual
Meeting (Memphis, TN) October 1997. (Prize for best paper by a student or recent Ph.D.)

“Skepticism about the external world and coherence among beliefs”, presented at Rutgers University
Graduate Philosophy Conference (New Brunswick, NJ) April 1997

“In defense of non-reliabilistic foundationalism”, presented at Mid-South Philosophy Conference
(Memphis, TN) February 1997

“Stroud and Moore on skepticism”, presented at Southwestern Philosophical Society Annual Meeting
(Kansas City, MO) November 1996

Comments Presented:

Comments on Ted Poston’s Reason and Explanation for Author Meets Critics session at Pacific Division
Meeting of the APA (Seattle, WA) April 2017

Comments on Duncan Pritchard’s *Epistemic Angst* for Author Meets Critics session at Pacific Division
Meeting of the APA (San Francisco, CA) March 2016

Comments on David Chalmers’s *Constructing the World* for Author Meets Critics session at Pacific
Division Meeting of the APA (San Francisco, CA) March 2013

Comments on Eric Marcus’s *Rational Causation* for Author Meets Critics session at Central Division
Meeting of the APA (New Orleans, LA) February 2013

Comments on Jeremy Fantl and Matthew McGrath’s *Knowledge in an Uncertain World* for Author
Meets Critics session at Central Division Meeting of the APA (Chicago, IL) February 2012

Comments on Ernest Sosa’s *A Virtue Epistemology: Apt Belief and Reflective Knowledge, volume II* for
Author Meets Critics session at Pacific Division Meeting of the APA (San Francisco, CA) March
2010

Discussant at 2009 Rutgers Epistemology Conference (New Brunswick, NJ) May 2009

Comment on Michael Williams’s “Scepticism, Evidence and Entitlement” at the University of
Edinburgh workshop on skepticism (Edinburgh, UK) May 2008

Comment on Peter Ludlow’s “Knowledge Reports and Indexicality” at the University of Aberdeen
Linguistics and Epistemology Conference (Aberdeen, Scotland) May 2007

Comment on Ernest Sosa’s “Epistemic Normativity” for On-line Philosophy Conference hosted by
Georgia State University, April 2007

Comment on John Hawthorne's "Epistemic Modals" at SOFIA XVIII Conference (Cancun, Mexico) January 2007

Comment on Anthony Corsetino's "Predicates and Properties" at Eastern Division Meeting of the APA (New York NY) December 2005

Comment on Duncan Pritchard's book *Epistemic Luck* at book symposium of Pacific Division Meeting of the APA (San Francisco, CA) March 2005

Comment on Allan Gibbard's "Truth and Correct Belief" at SOFIA XVI Conference (Huatulco, Mexico) January 2005

Comment on Mylan Engel's "The Equivocal or Question-Begging Nature of Evil Demon Arguments for External World Skepticism" at Southwestern Philosophical Society Meeting (New Orleans, LA) November 2004

Comment on Paul Boghossian's "Epistemic Relativism" at SOFIA XV Conference (Porto Alegre, Brazil) May 2004

Comment on Juan Comesana's "Unsafe Knowledge" at Pacific Division Meeting of the APA (Pasadena, CA) March 2004

Comment on Susanna Siegel's "Misperception" at Virgil C. Aldrich Wasatch Front Philosophy Conference (Salt Lake City, UT) April 2002

Comment on Jonathan Schaffer's "Contrastive Knowledge" at Pacific Division Meeting of the APA (Seattle, WA) March 2002

Comment on James Summerford's "Virtue epistemology and the Gettier problem" at Central Division Meeting of the APA (New Orleans, LA) May 1999

Comment on Eric Rubenstein's "Sellars without homogeneity" at Pacific Division Meeting of the APA (Berkeley, CA) April 1999

Teaching:

Coursera

Reasoning Across the Disciplines	Beginning Spring 17, ongoing
Think Again: How to Reason and Argue	Beginning Fall 13, ongoing

University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill

Critical Thinking	Spring 17
Critical Thinking	Summer 16
Seminar: Reasoning and Rule Following	Spring 16
Dissertation Research Seminar	Fall 15
Critical Thinking	Fall 15
Introduction to Philosophy: Main Problems	Summer 15
Critical Thinking	Summer 15
Seminar: The history of skepticism	Spring 15
Critical Thinking	Spring 15

Dissertation Research Seminar	Fall 14
Introduction to Philosophy: Main Problems	Summer 14
Theory of Knowledge	Spring 14
Dissertation Research Seminar	Spring 14
Critical Thinking	Fall 13

Administrative Responsibilities:

University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill

Faculty Council (15 – 17)

Department of Philosophy, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill

Chair, placement committee	(04 – 05, 08 – 18)
Recruitment committee	(04 – 08, 14 – 15)
Chair, Visitor recruitment committee	(03 – 04)
Graduate admissions committee	(03 – 04, 06 – 08)
Placement committee	(03 – 17)
Speakers committee	(05 – 08, 12 - 13)
Philosophy of mind area exam committee	(03 – 08, 15 - 17)
Epistemology area exam committee	(03 – 17)
Modern philosophy area exam committee	(03 – 06)
Organizer of Workshop on Epistemic Norms	(05 – 06)
Grievance committee	(11 – 13)

Service to the Profession:

Book Symposium Editor for *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* (2014 – present)

Referee for *Acta Analytica*, *American Philosophical Quarterly*, *Analysis*, *Analytic Philosophy*, *Australasian Journal of Philosophy*, *British Journal for the History of Philosophy*, *British Journal for the Philosophy of Science*, *Canadian Journal of Philosophy*, *Dialectica*, *Episteme*, *Ergo*, *Ethical Theory and Moral Practice*, *Erkenntnis*, *European Journal of Philosophy*, *Inquiry*, *International Journal of Philosophical Studies*, *Journal of Philosophy*, *Journal of Philosophical Research*, *Law and Philosophy*, *Mind*, *Mind and Language*, *Nous*, *Pacific Philosophical Quarterly*, *Philosophers' Imprint*, *Philosophia*, *Philosophical Papers*, *Philosophical Review*, *Philosophical Studies*, *Philosophical Psychology*, *Philosophical Quarterly*, *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, *Philosophy Compass*, *Southern Journal of Philosophy*, *Synthese*, *Teorema*, *Theoria*, *Thought*, Cambridge University Press, Harvard University Press, Oxford University Press, Palgrave MacMillan, Polity Press, Princeton University Press, Routledge Press, Taylor and Francis, Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Rutgers' Young Epistemologist Prize, Sanders Prize for Epistemology, Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada, Israeli Science Foundation, Swiss National Science Foundation, Southern Society for Philosophy and Psychology

Member of program committee for Eastern Division of the American Philosophical Association (spring 2006 – fall 2008); advisory committee for Eastern Division of the American Philosophical Association (summer 2010 – summer 2013)

Editorial Board for *Philosophy Compass* and for Continuum's *Critical Introductions to Epistemology* series

Tenure and promotion reviewer for over 30 departments (2011 – present)