Department Talk: Christine Korsgaard, Harvard University

Refreshments to follow this lecture in Hyde Hall.

Title: “Constitutivism and the Value of Action” 

Abstract:  

What makes an action a good action, and how is its goodness related to its rightness? Many moral philosophers accept this view: an action that ought to be done is a “right” action; and when it is done from moral motives, then it is a “good” action, specifically, a morally good action.  This view makes the moral goodness of action an “external” standard.  We regard an action as good when it serves some purpose or meets some standard that we happen to have for actions. Actions may be judged to be good in the sense of being useful, prudent, diplomatic, or in other ways, depending on the purposes we have for them or the point of view from which we judge them.  What they cannot be is good considered simply as actions.  There is no “internal” or “constitutive” standard that applies to them.  Constitutivism, a view derived from Kant, is the view that actions by their nature aim at realizing the autonomy and effectiveness of their agents, and actions that succeed in achieving these values are good as actions. If Kant is correct in identifying autonomy with morality, then moral goodness is a constitutive standard for action. I argue that it follows that the rightness of action depends upon its goodness, not the reverse, and that we do not need any special motive for doing the right thing.  Whenever we act, we are attempting to do a good action, and if a good action is autonomous, then whenever we act, we are attempting to do the right thing.