Thomas Hofweber specializes in metaphysics, the philosophy of language, and the philosophy of mathematics.
His first book, Ontology and the Ambitions of Metaphysics, will appear shortly with Oxford University Press. He is currently working on a book entitled Idealism and the Limits of Conceptual Representation, which admittedly defends idealism, but it’s not as bad as that sounds. A long time ago he co-edited, with Anthony Everett, the collection Empty Names, Fiction, and the Puzzles of Non-Existence CSLI Publications (2000).
Sample article publications include: “Proof-theoretic reduction as a philosopher’s tool” Erkenntnis (2000) (selected for the Philosopher’s Annual in 2001) “A Puzzle about Ontology” Noûs (2005); “Inexpressible Properties and Propositions” Oxford Studies in Metaphysics (2005) (winner of the Oxford Studies Younger Metaphysician Prize, and the APA Article Prize); “Supervenience and Object-Dependent Properties” Journal of Philosophy (2005); “Number Determiners, Numbers, and Arithmetic” Philosophical Review (2005); “Innocent Statements and their Metaphysically Loaded Counterparts” Philosophers’ Imprint (2007) (selected for the Philosopher’s Annual in 2008); “Validity, Paradox, and the Ideal of Deductive Logic” in JC Beall (ed.) Revenge of the Liar (2008); “The Meta-Problem of Change” Noûs (2009); “Ambitious, Yet Modest, Metaphysics” in Metametaphysics, Chalmers, Manley, and Wasserman (eds.) (2009); “Formal tools and the philosophy of mathematics” New Waves in the Philosophy of Mathematics, Bueno and Linnebo (eds.) (2009); “How to endure” (with J. David Velleman) Philosophical Quarterly (2011). “Infinitesimal Chances” Philosophers’ Imprint (2014). “Cardinality arguments against regular probability measures” Thought (2014). “Hyperreal-valued probability measures approximating a real-valued measure” (with Ralf Schindler) forthcoming in the Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic (2016). “Carnap’s Big Idea” forthcoming in Ontology after Carnap, Blatti and LaPointe (eds.) OUP (2016), “The place of subjects in the metaphysics of material objects” dialectica (2015). “Are there ineffable aspects of reality?” forthcoming in Oxford Studies in Metaphysics (2016). “Conceptual idealism without ontological idealism: why idealism is true after all” forthcoming in Idealism: new essays in metaphysics, Goldschmidt and Pearce (eds). OUP (2016).
For a more complete list of papers, see his homepage.