My interests include the philosophy of cognitive science, the philosophy of mind, the philosophy of psychology, and the philosophy of science. My most recent work has examined issues in moral psychology (particularly focusing on people's paradoxical responsibility judgments), the nature of beliefs (and 'aliefs'), and belief fixation. I have also done work on numerical modularity, the psychology of political extremism, how the advance of neuroscience will affect the law, and John Locke's psychological theories. I'm currently finishing my dissertation, which is focused on belief fixation and irrationality. In 2009 I was awarded an ACLS Mellon Dissertation Completion Fellowship and was inducted into the UNC Society of Fellows (as a Dissertation Fellow). My CV and a sampling of papers are posted below.

Responsibility and the Brain Sciences

This paper investigates people's responsibility judgments of the mentally and neurologically impaired. The results of his investigation are then used to discuss how the advance of neuroscience might affect the law. (With Felipe De Brigard and David Ripley, forthcoming in the December 2009 issue of Ethical Theory and Moral Practice.)

Explaining the Abstract/Concrete Paradoxes in Moral Psychology: NBAR Theory (Draft)

This paper offers a theory that sees the 'abstract/concrete' paradoxes as of a piece with other seemingly disparate phenomena, like the side-effect effect and people's tendency to anthropomorphize inanimate objects. This theory explains the aforementioned data by hypothesizing that people harbor an unconscious but causally active belief that for every broken norm, there is an agent who's actions were responsible for the breaking of that norm (hence NBAR theory for 'Norm Broken, Agent Responsible'). (With David Ripley).

Locke's Answer to Molyneux's Thought Experiment

This paper examines how Locke's theory of mental processes explains his answer to the Molyneux question. (With Mike Bruno, forthcoming in the April 2010 issue of History of Philosophy Quarterly.)

Thinking is Believing

This paper argues that it is impossible to consider a proposition without believing that proposition.