Ram Neta specializes in epistemology and is currently at work on a book on the nature of knowledge.  He is also trying to understand how evidence governs rational confidence, how rational confidence constrains rational belief, how knowledge guides inquiry, what sort of epistemic accessibility our reasons for belief must have, and why some skeptical arguments are so much more plausible than others.  He regularly teaches seminars on these and other topics in epistemology, occasionally teaches seminars in the philosophy of mind or on the history of analytic philosophy, and also regularly teaches an introductory course in philosophy with about 200 students.  His publications include: 

• "S knows that P", Noûs 36 (2002): 663 - 689.
  
• "Contextualism and the Problem of the External World", Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 66 (2003): 1 - 31.
  
• "Skepticism, Contextualism, and Semantic Self-Knowledge", Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 67 (2003): 396 - 411.
  
• "Perceptual Evidence and the New Dogmatism," Philosophical Studies 119 (2004): 199 - 214.
  
• "Luminosity and the Safety of Knowledge", (co-authored with Guy Rohrbaugh) Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 85 (2004): 396 - 406.
  
• "Skepticism, Abductivism, and the Explanatory Gap", Philosophical Issues 14 (2004): 296 - 325.
  
• "The Normative Significance of Brute Facts", Legal Theory 10 (2004): 199 - 214.
  
• "A Contextualist Solution to the Problem of Easy Knowledge", Grazer Philosophische Studien 69 (2005): 63 - 85.
  
• "Epistemology Factualized: New Contractarian Foundations for Epistemology", Synthese 150 (2006): 247 - 280.
  
• "Safety and Epistemic Luck", (co-authored with Avram Hiller) Synthese 158 (2007): 303 - 313.
  
• "Contextualism and a Puzzle About Seeing", Philosophical Studies 134 (2007): 53 - 63.
  
• "Propositional Justification, Evidence, and the Cost of Error", Philosophical Issues 17 (2007): 197 - 216.
  
• "In Defense of Epistemic Relativism", Episteme 4 (2007): 30 - 48.
  
• "Fixing the Transmission: the New Mooreans" in Themes from G.E. Moore: New Essays in Epistemology and Ethics, ed. by Nuccetelli and Seay (Oxford, 2007): 62 - 83.
• "McDowell and the New Evil Genius", (co-authored with Duncan Pritchard), Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 74 (2007): 381 - 396.
  
• "Anti-Intellectualism and the Knowledge-Action Principle", Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 75 (2007): 180 - 187.
  
• "In Defense of Disjunctivism" in Disjunctivism: Perception, Action, and Knowledge, ed. by MacPherson and Haddock (Oxford, 2008): 311 - 329.
• "What Evidence Do You Have?", British Journal for Philosophy of Science 59 (2008): 89 - 119.
  
• "How to Naturalize Epistemology" in New Waves in Epistemology, ed. by Pritchard and Hendricks (Palgrave, 2008): 324 - 353.
• "How Cheap Can You Get?", Philosophical Issues 18 (2008): 130 - 142.
• "Undermining the Case for Contrastivism", Social Epistemology 22 (2008): 289 - 304.
• "Empiricism about Experience", Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 79 (2009): 482 - 489.
• "Treating Something as a Reason for Action", Noûs 43 (2009): 684 - 99.
• "Defeating the Dogma of Defeasibility" in Williamson on Knowledge, ed. by Greenough and Pritchard (Oxford, 2009): 161 - 82.
• "Mature Human Knowledge as a Standing in the Space of Reasons", Philosophical Topics 37 (2009): 115 - 32.
• "Liberalism and Conservatism in the Epistemology of Perceptual Belief", Australasian Journal of Philosophy 88 (2010): 685 - 705.
• "Should We Swap Internal Foundations for Virtues?", Critica 42 (2010): 43 - 56.
• "Can A Prioricity of Entitlement be Preserved by Testimony?" in Social Epistemology, ed. by Haddock, Millar, and Pritchard (Oxford, 2010): 194 - 215.
• "Reflections on Reflective Knowledge", Philosophical Studies 153 (2011): 3 - 17.
• "The Nature and Reach of Privileged Access" in Self-Knowledge, ed. by Hatzimoysis (Oxford, 2011): 9 - 32.
  
• "A Refutation of Cartesian Fallibilism", Noûs 45 (2011): 658 - 95.
  
• "Quine, Goldman, and Two Ways of Naturalizing Epistemology" in Epistemology:  The Key Thinkers, edited by Hetherington (Continuum, 2012): 193 - 213.
  
• "Knowing from the Armchair When Our Intuitions are Reliable", The Monist 95 (2012): 332 - 54.
• "Easy Knowledge, Transmission Failure, and Empiricism", Oxford Studies in Epistemology 4 (2012).
  
• "Klein's Case for Infinitism" in Infinitism, edited by Turri and Klein (Oxford, forthcoming).
• "Easy Knowledge and Propositional Justification" in The Present and Future of Virtue Epistemology, edited by Fernandez (Oxford, forthcoming).
• "The Epistemic 'Ought'" in Naturalizing Epistemic Virtue, edited by Fairweather (Cambridge, forthcoming). 
• "The Case Against Purity", Philosophy and Phenomenological Research (forthcoming).