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Keith Simmons
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Keith Simmons has research interests in logic, the history and philosophy of logic, philosophy of language, and Kant’s ethics. His book on truth and the liar paradox, Universality and the Liar, appeared in hardback in 1993 and in paperback in 2008. He is the co-editor (with Simon Blackburn) of Truth, in the Oxford Readings in Philosophy Series (1999).


Reference, Extension, Truth: A General Theory of Paradox.   A monograph on paradoxes of definability, Russell’s paradox, and the truth paradoxes.

If Truth Be Told: Deflationism, Truth and Meaning (with Dorit Bar-On).   A monograph on theories of truth, with an extended critique of deflationism and a defence of a form of substantivism about truth.

Logic and Metalogic.  Draft of a logic text, covering sentential and quantificational logic, metalogic, and special topics.

SAMPLE PUBLICATIONS: “On a Medieval Solution to the Liar Paradox,” History and Philosophy of Logic (1987); “Kant on Moral Worth,” History of Philosophy Quarterly (1989); “The Diagonal Argument and the Liar,” Journal of Philosophic Logic (1990); “Outline of a Contextual Theory of Truth,” Proceedings of Logica 1991, An International Conference in Logic (1991); “On an Argument against Omniscience,” Noûs (1993); “A Paradox of Definability: Richard’s and Poincaré’s ways out,” History and Philosophy of Logic (1994); “Paradoxes of Denotation,” Philosophical Studies (1994); “Poincaré and Paradox,” Henri Poincaré: Science and Philosophy (1996); “Deflationary Truth and the Liar,” Journal of Philosophic Logic (1999); “Three Paradoxes: Circles and Singularities,” Circularity, Definition and Truth (2000); “Sets, Classes, and Extensions: a Singularity Approach to Russell’s Paradox,” Philosophical Studies (2000); “Reference and Paradox,” Liars and Heaps: New Essays on Paradox (2003); “Semantical and Logical Paradox,” A Companion to Philosophic Logic (2002); “A Critique of Dialetheism," The Law of Non--Contradiction: New Philosophic Essays (with Greg Littmann, 2004); “A Berry and a Russell without self-reference”, Philosophical Studies (2005); “Truth”, The Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2nd edition (2006); “The use of force against deflationism: assertion and truth” with Dorit Bar-On, Truth and Speech Acts: Studies in the Philosophy of Language (2006); “Deflationism” with Dorit Bar-On, The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Language (2006); “Deflationism and the autonomy of truth” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research (2006);  “Revenge and Context”, in The Revenge of the Liar, edited by J.C. Beall, Oxford University Press 2007;  “The use of force against deflationism: assertion and truth” (with Dorit Bar-On), in Truth and Speech Acts: Studies in the Philosophy of Language, D. Greimann and G. Siegwart (eds.), Routledge 2007, pp.61-89;  “Tarski’s Logic: Mathematics, Metamathematics, Logic and Semantics”, in Handbook of the History of  Logic, vol. 5, Logic from Russell to Church, edited by John Woods and Dov Gabbay (eds.), Elsevier B.V. 2009, pp.511-616.


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