Professor Long specializes in philosophy of mind, epistemology, and metaphysics. He has published papers on a variety of topics, including persons, action, the mind-body problem, the concept of the human body, knowledge of other minds, and skepticism. His most recent work concentrates on an expressivist view of self-knowledge and on an alternative to dualism and reductive materialism.
Sample publications include: “The Philosophical Concept of a Human Body,” Philosophical Review (1964); “The Bodies of Persons,” Journal of Philosophy (1974); “Agents, Mechanisms, and Other Minds,” in Body, Mind, and Method, Gustafson and Tapscott eds. (1979); The Self-Defeating Character of Scepticism,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research (1992); “Why Machines Can Neither Think Nor Feel,” in Language, Mind, and Art ed. by Jamieson (1994); “Avowals and First-Person Privilege” (with Dorit Bar-On, 2001); “Why Life is Necessary for Mind: The Significance of Animate Behavior” in Self, Language, and World: Problems from Kant, Sellars, and Rosenberg: in Memory of Jay F. Rosenberg, O’Shea and Rubenstein, eds. 2010.