**Curriculum Vitae**

**Ram Neta**

Dept. of Philosophy

CB #3125, Caldwell Hall University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill Chapel Hill, NC 27599-3125

Phone: 919-962-3321

[neta@email.unc.edu](mailto:neta@email.unc.edu)

**Employment:**

Professor of Philosophy, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, 2013 – present.

Associate Professor of Philosophy, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, 2008 – 2013. Assistant Professor of Philosophy, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, 2003 – 2008. Assistant Professor of Philosophy, University of Utah, 1998 – 2003.

Visiting Instructor, Department of Philosophy, Carnegie Mellon University, 1995 - 97.

**Education:**

University of Pittsburgh, Ph.D., philosophy, 1997. Harvard University, A.B., philosophy, 1988.

**Awards:**

UNC-Chapel Hill University Research Council Award, 2007

UNC-Chapel Hill Junior Faculty Development Award, 2005

UNC-Chapel Hill College of Arts and Sciences Spray-Randleigh Faculty Fellowship, 2003

University of Utah Faculty Fellowship, 2000

Participant in NEH Summer Seminar “Moore and Wittgenstein on Certainty”, UCSD, 1998

Southwestern Philosophical Society prize for “How can there be semantic facts?”, 1997

National Science Foundation Graduate Fellowship, 1990-1993

**Edited Works:**

*Philosophical Issues: A Supplement to Nous, Volume XX: Normativity* (forthcoming)

*Current Controversies in Epistemology*, *Routledge* (2013)

*Epistemology: Volumes 1 - 4*, *Routledge* (2012)

*Thinking Independently: An Introduction to Philosophy*, *Cognella* (2010, revised edition 2012)

*Arguing about Knowledge*, co-edited with Duncan Pritchard, *Routledge* (2009)

**Articles:**

“Reasons for Which”, *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* (forthcoming)

“Coherence”, *Philosophical Issues: A Supplement to Nous* (forthcoming)

“Perceptual Evidence and the Capacity View”, *Philosophical Studies* (forthcoming)

“How Holy is the Disjunctivist Grail?”, *Journal of Philosophical Research* (forthcoming)

“Chalmers’s Frontloading Argument for *A Priori* Scrutability”, *Analysis Reviews* **74** (2014): 651 – 61.

“Epistemic Circularity and Virtuous Coherence” in *The Present and Future of Virtue Epistemology*, edited by Miguel Fernandez (Oxford University Press, 2014)

“Does the Epistemic ‘Ought’ Imply the Cognitive ‘Can’?” in *Naturalizing Epistemic Virtue*, edited by

Abrol Fairweather (Cambridge University Press, 2014)

“Klein’s Case for Infinitism” in *Ad Infinitum: New Essays on Epistemological Infinitism*, edited by Peter Klein and John Turri (Oxford University Press, 2014)

“What is an Inference?” in *Philosophical Issues: A Supplement to Nous* (2013)

“Easy Knowledge, Transmission Failure, and Empiricism”, *Oxford Studies in Epistemology* **4** (2013):

166 – 84.

“The Case Against Purity”, *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* **85** (2012): 456 – 64.

“Knowing from the Armchair that Our Intuitions are Reliable”, *The Monist* **95** (2012): 332 – 54.

“Quine, Goldman, and Two Ways of Naturalizing Epistemology” in *Epistemology: The Key Thinkers*, edited by Stephen Hetherington (Continuum, 2012): 193 – 213.

“The Nature and Reach of Privileged Access” in *Self-Knowledge*, edited by Anthony Hatzimoysis

(Oxford University Press, 2011): 9 – 32.

“Reflections on *Reflective Knowledge*”, *Philosophical Studies* **153** (2011): 3- 17.

“A Refutation of Cartesian Fallibilism”, *Nous* **45** (2011): 658 – 95.

“Can *A Priori* Entitlement be Preserved by Testimony?” in *Social Epistemology*, edited by Adrian

Haddock, Alan Millar, and Duncan Pritchard (Oxford University Press, 2010): 194 – 215.

“Should We Swap Internal Foundations for Virtues?”, *Critica* **42** (2010): 43 – 56.

“Liberalism and Conservatism in the Epistemology of Perceptual Belief”, *Australasian Journal of*

*Philosophy* **88** (2010): 685 - 705.

“Human Knowledge as a Standing in the Space of Reasons”, *Philosophical Topics* **37** (2009): 115 –

32.

“Defeating the Dogma of Defeasibility” in *Williamson on Knowledge,* edited by Patrick Greenough and Duncan Pritchard (Oxford University Press, 2009): 161 – 82.

“Treating Something as a Reason for Action”, *Nous* **43** (2009): 684 – 99.

“Empiricism about Experience”, *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* **79** (2009): 482 – 9.

“Undermining the Case for Contrastivism”, *Social Epistemology* **22** (2008): 289 – 304.

“How Cheap Can You Get?”, *Philosophical Issues: A Supplement to Nous* **18** (2008): 130 – 142.

“How to Naturalize Epistemology” in *New Waves in Epistemology*, edited by Duncan Pritchard and

Victor Hendricks (Palgrave Macmillan, 2008): 324 – 53.

“What Evidence Do You Have?”, *British Journal for Philosophy of Science* **59** (2008): 89 – 119.

Reprinted in *Epistemology*, volume 3, edited by Ram Neta (Routledge: London, 2012).

“In Defense of Disjunctivism” in *Disjunctivism: Perception, Action, Knowledge*, edited by Fiona

MacPherson and Adrian Haddock (Oxford University Press, 2008): 311 – 29.

“Fixing the Transmission: The New Mooreans” in *Themes from G.E. Moore: New Essays in Epistemology and Ethics*, edited by Susana I. Nuccetelli and Gary Seay (Oxford University Press, 2007): 62 – 83.

“Safety and Epistemic Luck” (with Avram Hiller), *Synthese* **158** (2007): 303 – 13.

“In Defense of Epistemic Relativism”, *Episteme* **4** (2007): 30 – 48.

“Anti-Intellectualism and the Knowledge-Action Principle”, *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* **75** (2007): 180 – 7.

“Propositional Justification, Evidence, and the Cost of Error”, *Philosophical Issues: A Supplement to Nous* **17** (2007): 197 – 216.

“McDowell and the New Evil Genius” (with Duncan Pritchard), *Philosophy and Phenomenological*

*Research* **74** (2007): 381 – 96.

“Reply to Gallimore”, *Philosophical Studies* **134** (2007): 71 – 2.

“Contextualism and a Puzzle about Seeing”, *Philosophical Studies* **134** (2007): 53 – 63.

“Epistemology Factualized: New Contractarian Foundations for Epistemology”, *Synthese* **150**

(2006): 247 – 280.

“A Contextualist Solution to the Problem of Easy Knowledge”, *Grazer Philosophische Studien* **69** (2005): 63 – 85.

“Luminosity and the Safety of Knowledge” (with Guy Rohrbaugh), *Pacific Philosophical Quarterly* **85**

(2004): 396 – 406.

“The Normative Significance of Brute Facts”, *Legal Theory* **10** (2004): 199 – 214.

Reprinted in *Law: Metaphysics, Meaning, and Objectivity*, edited by Enrique Villanueva (Rodopi: Amsterdam and New York, 2007): 75-94.

“Skepticism, Abductivism, and the Explanatory Gap”, *Philosophical Issues: A Supplement to Nous* **14**

(2004): 296 – 325.

“Perceptual Evidence and the New Dogmatism”, *Philosophical Studies* **119** (2004): 199 – 214.

“Skepticism, Contextualism, and Semantic Self-Knowledge”, *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* **67** (2003): 396 – 411.

“Contextualism and the Problem of the External World”, *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* **66** (2003): 1 – 31.

“S knows that p”, *Nous* **36** (2002): 663 – 681.

“How can there be semantic facts?”, *Southwest Philosophy Review* **14** (1998): 25 – 30.

“Stroud and Moore on skepticism”, *Southwest Philosophy Review* **13** (1997): 83 - 89.

**Entries in Reference Works:**

“Skepticism about the External World” in *Skepticism: From Antiquity to the Present*, edited by Diego

Manchuca and Baron Reed (Bloomsbury, forthcoming)

“Philosophy of Language for Epistemology” in *Routledge Companion to the Philosophy of Language*, edited by Delia Graff Fara and Gillian Russell (Routledge, 2012): 693 – 704.

“The Basing Relation” in *Routledge Companion to Epistemology*, edited by Sven Bernecker and Duncan

Pritchard (Routledge, 2010): 109 – 18.

“Causal Theories of Knowledge and Perception” in *Oxford Handbook of Causation*, edited by Helen

Beebee and Peter Menzies (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009): 592 – 606.

“Contextualism” in *The Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, 2nd Edition, edited by Donald Borchert (Detroit: MacMillan Reference USA, 2006):

**Book Reviews:**

Review of Anthony Brueckner, *Essays on Skepticism* (Oxford University Press, 2010), *Mind*

(forthcoming)

Review of Jason Stanley, *Knowledge and Practical Interests* (Oxford University Press, 2005), *The*

*Philosophical Review* **121** (2012): 298 – 301.

Review of Jeremy Fantl and Matthew McGrath, *Knowledge in an Uncertain World* (Oxford University

Press, 2009), *The Philosophical Quarterly* **62** (2011): 211 – 5.

Review of Ernest Sosa, *A Virtue Epistemology* (Oxford University Press, 2007), *Notre Dame Philosophical* *Reviews* (May, 2008)

Review of David Finkelstein, *Expression and the Inner* (Harvard University Press, 2003), *The Philosophical* *Review* **117** (2008): 310 – 3.

Review of *Naturalism in Question*, eds. De Caro and Macarthur (Harvard University Press, 2004), *The*

*Philosophical Review* **116** (2007): 657 – 63.

Review of Christopher Peacocke, *The Realm of Reason* (Oxford University Press, 2003), *Notre Dame*

*Philosophical Reviews* (October, 2004)

**Presentations**:

“Reasons for Which”, presented to Rutgers Epistemology Conference (New Brunswick, NJ) May 2015

“Coherence, Intelligibility, Rationality”, presented to

Pacific Division Meeting of the APA (Vancouver, BC) April 2015

20th Annual Meeting of SOFIA (Huatulco, MX) January 2015

The Philosophy Department at the University of Alabama (Tuscaloosa, AL) November 2014

“Hypothetical Cases, and the Program of Negative X-Phi”, presented to

Eastern Division Meeting of the APA (Baltimore, MD), December 2013

“Knowledge and Reasons”, presented as keynote address to Calgary Graduate Philosophy

Conference (Calgary, AB) March 2013

“What is an Inference?”, presented to

The Philosophy Department at the University of Nebraska (Lincoln, NE) April 2014

The Philosophy Department at the University of Colorado (Boulder, CO) February 2014

The Philosophy Department at Princeton University (Princeton, NJ) February 2014

The Philosophy Department at Stanford University (Palo Alto, CA) December 2013

The Philosophy Department at the University of Geneva (Geneva, Swithzerland) April 2013

The Philosophy Department at Oberlin College (Oberlin, OH) February 2013

The Philosophy Department at the University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill (Chapel Hill, NC) November 2012

“Does the Epistemic ‘Ought’ Imply the Cognitive ‘Can’?”, presented to

The Philosophy Department at McMaster University (Hamilton, ON) September 2012

The Philosophy Department at the University of Guelph (Guelph, ON) September 2012

The Arche Center at the University of St. Andrews (St. Andrews, UK) May 2012

The UNC/King’s College, London Epistemology Conference (London, UK) May 2012

The Philosophy Department at the University of Edinburgh (Edinburgh, UK) May 2012

The Northwestern/Notre Dame Philosophy Conference (Chicago, IL) April 2012

Central Division Meeting of the APA (Chicago, IL) April 2012

“Easy Knowledge, Transmission Failure, and Empiricism”, presented to

The Philosophy Department at the University of Pittsburgh (Pittsburgh, PA) November 2011

The Philosophy Department at Fordham University (New York, NY) November 2011

The Philosophy Department at the University of Richmond (Richmond, VA) November 2011

“Easy Knowledge and Reliabilism”, presented to

Pacific Division Meeting of the APA (San Diego, CA) April 2011

“Knowing from the Armchair that Our Intuitions are Reliable”, presented to

NEH Summer Seminar on Experimental Epistemology (Tucson, AZ) July 2012

Workshop on Experimental Epistemology (San Diego, CA) April 2011

“Sosa on Basic Knowledge and Easy Knowledge”, presented to

The Virtue Epistemology Conference at UNAM (Mexico City, Mexico) January 2011

“Knowledge, Safety and the State of Nature”, presented to

The Arche Center at the University of St. Andrews (St. Andrews, UK) May 2010

Conference on Cognitive Ethology at the University of Edinburgh (Edinburgh, UK) May 2010

“Easy Knowledge, Bootstrapping, and Higher-Order Reasons”, presented to

Arche Conference on Evidence (St. Andrews, UK) May 2010

The Philosophy Department at the University of Vermont (Burlington, VT) April 2010

“Evidence that Stakes Don’t Matter to Evidence”, presented (with Mark Phelan) at the Experimental

Epistemology Workshop at the University of Buffalo (Buffalo, NY) October 2009

“Defending the Purity of Knowledge: A Reply to Fantl and McGrath”, presented at the Arche

Conference on Contextualism (St. Andrews, UK) May 2009

“Liberalism, Conservatism, Mooreanism, and Rationalism”, presented at the Conference on the

Epistemology of Perceptual Judgment at Brown University (Providence, RI) February 2009

“Epistemic Possibility: In Defense of Contextualism”, presented to

Pacific Division Meeting of the APA (Pasadena, CA) March 2008

“Knowledge and the Space of Reasons, presented to

AHRC workshop on basic knowledge (Edinburgh, UK) May 2008

AHRC conference at the University of Stirling (Stirling, UK) November 2007

“Coherence”, presented to

The Philosophy Department at the University of Texas (Austin, TX) August 2008

The Philosophy Department at St. Andrews University (St. Andrews, UK) May 2008

Cambridge Moral Sciences Club at University of Cambridge (Cambridge, UK) May 2008

The Philosophy Department at Harvard University (Cambridge, MA) April 2008

The Philosophy Department at the Johns Hopkins University (Baltimore, MD) October 2007

“Coherence, the Preface, and the Lottery”, presented to

The Bled Epistemology Conference (Bled, Slovenia) May 2007

The Philosophy Department at the University of Aberdeen (Aberdeen, UK) May 2007

The Philosophy Department at the University of Edinburgh (Edinburgh, UK) May 2007

The Philosophy Department at Virginia Commonwealth University (Richmond, VA) March 2007

“Defending Access Internalism”, presented at Pacific Division Meeting of the APA (Portland, OR) March 2006

“Defeating the Dogma of Defeasibility”, presented to

The Philosophy Department at the University of Michigan (Ann Arbor, MI) February 2006

The Philosophy Department at the University of North Carolina – Chapel Hill (Chapel Hill, NC) December 2005

“Fixing the Transmission: The New Mooreans”, presented to

Graduate Seminar at Brown University (Providence, RI) February 2006

The Philosophy Department at the Australian National University (Canberra, Australia) November

2005

The Philosophy Department at the University of Melbourne (Melbourne, Australia) October 2005

“In Defense of Disjunctivism”, presented at the Conference on Disjunctivism at the University of

Glasgow (Glasgow, UK) June 2005

“What Makes for Epistemic Excellence?”, presented at Central Division Meeting of the APA (Chicago, IL) April 2005

“An Internalist Refutation of Fallibilism”, presented to

The Philosophy Department at Monash University (Melbourne, Australia) October 2005

The Philosophy Department at East Carolina University (Greenville, NC) April 2005

The Philosophy Department at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (Cambridge, MA) March

2005

“Undermining the Case for Contrastivism”, presented at the Conference on Contrastivism at the

University of Aarhus (Aarhus, Denmark) February 2005

“The Indefeasibility of Knowledge and Rational Belief”, presented to Southern Society for

Philosophy and Psychology Meeting (New Orleans, LA) April 2004

“Skepticism, Contextualism, and a Puzzle about Seeing”, presented to

Semantics/Pragmatics Workshop at the University of Virginia (Charlottesville, VA) May 2004

Inland Northwest Philosophy Conference (Pullman, WA and Moscow, ID) May 2004

Epistemology Conference at the University of North Carolina, Greensboro (Greensboro, NC) March

2004

“The Normative Significance of Brute Facts”, presented to the Conference on Legal Philosophy at the Universidad Nacional Autonoma de Mexico (University City, Mexico) July 2003

“Why Should We Trust Our Senses?”, presented to

Graduate Seminar on Concepts at Princeton University (Princeton, NJ) April 2003

The Philosophy Department of the University of Florida (Gainesville, FL) April 2003

"Luminosity and the Safety of Knowledge" (with Guy Rohrbaugh), presented at Pacific Division

Meeting of the APA (San Francisco, CA) March 2003

“Why Should We Trust Appearances?”, presented at North Carolina Philosophical Society Meeting

(Charlotte, NC) February 2003

"Basic Knowledge and Easy Knowledge", presented to the Philosophy Department at Auburn

University (Auburn, AL) December 2002

“Perceptual Evidence and the New Dogmatism”, presented at the conference “Contextualism in Epistemology and Beyond”, hosted by the Philosphy Department of the University of Massachusettes (Amherst, MA) October 2002

“How Experience Teaches”, presented to the Philosophy Department of the University of North

Carolina, Chapel Hill (Chapel Hill, NC) August 2002

“Abductive Solutions to Cartesian Skepticism”, presented at Pacific Division APA Meeting of

Society for Skeptical Studies (Seattle, WA) March 2002

“What is Perception?”, presented to the

Philosophy Department of the University of Utah (Salt Lake City, UT) April 2002

Philosophy Department of York University (Toronto, Ontario) February 2002

“The Possibility of a Feminist Epistemology”, presented at a Rosenblatt lunch meeting of the

Philosophy Department of the University of Utah (Salt Lake City, UT) January 2002

“Abductive Solutions to Cartesian Skepticism”, presented to the

Philosophy Department of the University of Hong Kong (Hong Kong, China) November 2001

Philosophy Department of Lingnan University (Hong Kong, China) November 2001

“Skepticism, Contextualism, and Semantic Self-Knowledge”, presented to the Philosophy

Department of the University of Massachusettes (Amherst, MA) April 2001

“Wittgenstein on skepticism and common sense”, presented to the Philosophy Department of

Hamilton College (Clinton, NY) April 2001

“Skepticism, Contextualism, and Semantic Tracking” presented at

Pacific Division APA Meeting of Society for Skeptical Studies (San Francisco, CA) March 2001

Mid-South Philosophy Conference (Memphis, TN) February 2001

“How to raise and lower the veil of ideas”, presented at the conference “Skepticism and Interpretation”, hosted by the Amsterdam School for Cultural Analysis, Theory and Interpretation (ASCA) at the University of Amsterdam (Amsterdam, The Netherlands) June 2000

“How to raise and lower the veil of ideas”, presented to

Ockham Society at the University of Oxford (Oxford, UK) October 2000

Philosophy Department of University College, London (London, UK) October 2000

Philosophy Department of the University of Reading (Reading, UK) October 2000

Philosophy Department of the University of British Columbia (Vancouver, BC) March 2000

Philosophy Department of the University of Utah (Salt Lake City, UT) February 1998

Department of Philosophy & Religion of Colgate University (Hamilton, NY) February 1998

Philosophy Department of the College of New Jersey (Trenton, NJ) January 1998

“S knows that p” presented to

Philosophy Department of the University of Southhampton (Southhampton, UK) October 2000

“How to be an infallibilist”, presented at

Eastern Divisional Meeting of the APA (Boston, MA) December 1999, and

North Texas Philosophical Association Meeting (Dallas, TX) March 1999

“Does the theory of knowledge rest on a mistake?”, presented to

Philosophy Department of the University of Utah (Salt Lake City, UT) January 2000

Philosophy Department of Auburn University (Auburn, AL) November 1999

“Rieber on Skepticism”, presented at

Mid-South Philosophy Conference (Memphis, TN) February 2000

Central States Philosophy Conference (Norman, OK) October 1999

“Skepticism and the first person”, presented at Mid-South Philosophy Conference (Memphis, TN) March 1999

“How can there be semantic facts?”, presented at Southwestern Philosophical Society Annual

Meeting (Memphis, TN) October 1997. (Prize for best paper by a student or recent Ph.D.)

“Skepticism about the external world and coherence among beliefs”, presented at Rutgers University

Graduate Philosophy Conference (New Brunswick, NJ) April 1997

“In defense of non-reliabilistic foundationalism”, presented at Mid-South Philosophy Conference

(Memphis, TN) February 1997

“Stroud and Moore on skepticism”, presented at Southwestern Philosophical Society Annual Meeting

(Kansas City, MO) November 1996

**Comments Presented**:

Comments on David Chalmers’s *Constructing the World* for Author Meets Critics session at Pacific

Division Meeting of the APA (San Francisco, CA) March 2013

Comments on Eric Marcus’s *Rational Causation* for Author Meets Critics session at Central Division

Meeting of the APA (New Orleans, LA) February 2013

Comments on Jeremy Fantl and Matthew McGrath’s *Knowledge in an Uncertain World* for Author Meets Critics session at Central Dvision Meeting of the APA (Chicago, IL) February 2012

Comments on Ernest Sosa’s *A Virtue Epistemology: Apt Belief and Reflective Knowledge, volume II* for

Author Meets Critics session at Pacific Division Meeting of the APA (San Francisco, CA) March

2010

Discussant at 2009 Rutgers Epistemology Conference (New Brunwick, NJ) May 2009

Comment on Michael Williams’s “Scepticism, Evidence and Entitlement” at the University of

Edinburgh workshop on skepticism (Edinburgh, UK) May 2008

Comment on Peter Ludlow’s “Knowledge Reports and Indexicality” at the University of Aberdeen

Linguistics and Epistemology Conference (Aberdeen, Scotland) May 2007

Comment on Ernest Sosa’s “Epistemic Normativity” for On-line Philosophy Conference hosted by

Georgia State University, April 2007

Comment on John Hawthorne’s “Epistemic Modals” at SOFIA XVIII Conference (Cancun, Mexico) January 2007

Comment on Anthony Corsentino’s “Predicates and Properties” at Eastern Division Meeting of the

APA (New York NY) December 2005

Comment on Duncan Pritchard’s book *Epistemic Luck* at book symposium of Pacific Division

Meeting of the APA (San Francisco, CA) March 2005

Comment on Allan Gibbard’s “Truth and Correct Belief” at SOFIA XVI Conference (Huatulco, Mexico) January 2005

Comment on Mylan Engel’s “The Equivocal or Question-Begging Nature of Evil Demon Arguments for External World Skepticism” at Southwestern Philosophical Society Meeting (New Orleans, LA) November 2004

Comment on Paul Boghossian’s “Epistemic Relativism” at SOFIA XV Conference (Porto Alegre, Brazil) May 2004

Comment on Juan Comesana’s “Unsafe Knowledge” at Pacific Division Meeting of the APA (Pasadena, CA) March 2004

Comment on Susanna Siegel’s “Misperception” at Virgil C. Aldrich Wasatch Front Philosophy

Conference (Salt Lake City, UT) April 2002

Comment on Jonathan Schaffer’s “Contrastive Knowledge” at Pacific Division Meeting of the APA (Seattle, WA) March 2002

Comment on James Summerford’s “Virtue epistemology and the Gettier problem” at Central

Division Meeting of the APA (New Orleans, LA) May 1999

Comment on Eric Rubenstein’s “Sellars without homogeneity” at Pacific Division Meeting of the

APA (Berkeley, CA) April 1999

**Courses Taught:**

**At the University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill**

Seminar: The history of skepticism Spring 15

Critical Thinking Spring 15

Dissertation Research Seminar Fall 14

Introduction to Philosophy: Main Problems Summer 14

Theory of Knowledge Spring 14

Dissertation Research Seminar Spring 14

Critical Thinking Fall 13

Introduction to Philosophy: Main Problems Summer 13

Dissertation research seminar Spring 13

Seminar: the philosophy of humor Spring 13

Introduction to Philosophy: Main Problems Fall 12

Introduction to Philosophy: Main Problems Summer 12

Dissertation research seminar Spring 12

Introduction to Philosophy: Main Problems Spring 12

Seminar: the problem of induction Fall 11

Introduction to Philosophy: Main Problems Summer 11

Seminar: early analytic philosophy Fall 10

Introduction to Philosophy: Main Problems Summer 10

Seminar: knowing our own minds Spring 10

Introduction to Philosophy: Main Problems Spring 10

Seminar: epistemic norms Fall 09

Introduction to Philosophy: Main Problems Summer 09

Theory of Knowledge Fall 08

Seminar: knowledge and justification Spring 08

Theory of Knowledge Spring 08

Seminar: reasons Fall 07

Introduction to Philosophy: Main Problems Fall 07

Protoseminar Spring 07

Introduction to Philosophy: Main Problems Spring 07

Seminar: early analytic philosophy Spring 06

Introduction to Philosophy: Main Problems Spring 06

Seminar: the regress of reasons Spring 05

Introduction to Philosophy: Main Problems Spring 05

History of Modern Philosophy Fall 04

Introduction to Philosophy: Main Problems Spring 04

Protoseminar Spring 04

Research group: epistemic rationality Fall 03

History of Modern Philosophy Fall 03

Seminar: early analytic philosophy Spring 03

Experience and Reality Spring 03

Seminar: philosophy of mind Fall 02

Introduction to Philosophy: Main Problems Fall 02

**Administrative Responsibilities:**

Department of Philosophy, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill

Chair, placement committee (04 – 05, 08 – 14) Recruitment committee (04 – 05, 06 – 08) Chair, Visitor recruitment committee (03 – 04) Graduate admissions committee (03 – 04, 06 – 08) Placement committee (03 – 12)

Speakers committee (05 – 08, 12 - 13) Philosophy of mind area exam committee (03 – 08) Epistemology area exam committee (03 – 12) Modern philosophy area exam committee (03 – 06) Organizer of Workshop on Epistemic Norms (05 – 06) Grievance committee (11 – 13)

**Service to the Profession:**

Book Symposium Editor for *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* (2014 – present)

Referee for *Acta Analytica*, *American Philosophical Quarterly*, *Analytic Philosophy*, *Australasian Journal of Philosophy*, *British Journal for Philosophy of Science*, *Canadian Journal of Philosophy*, *Dialectica*, *Episteme*, *Ethical Theory and Moral Practice*, *Erkenntnis*, *European Journal of Philosophy*, *Inquiry*, *International Journal of Philosophical Studies*, *Journal of Philosophical Research*, *Law and Philosophy*, *Mind*, *Mind and Language*, *Nous*, *Pacific Philosophical Quarterly*, *Philosophers’ Imprint*, *Philosophia*, *Philosophical Papers*, *Philosophical Review*, *Philosophical Studies*, *Philosophical Psychology*, *Philosophical Quarterly*, *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, *Philosophy Compass*, *Southern Journal of Philosophy*, *Synthese*, *Teorema*, *Theoria*

Referee for Cambridge University Press, Harvard University Press, Oxford University Press, Palgrave MacMillan, Princeton University Press, Routledge Press, Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Rutgers’ Young Epistemologist Prize (2009), Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada, Israeli Science Foundation, Swiss National Science Foundation, Southern Society for Philosophy and Psychology

Member of program committee for Eastern Division of the American Philosophical Association (spring 2006 – fall 2008); advisory committee for Eastern Division of the American Philosophical Association (summer 2010 – summer 2013)

Editorial Board for *Philosophy Compass* and for Continuum’s *Critical Introductions to Epistemology* series

Tenure and promotion reviewer for many departments (2011 - present) Survey respondent for *Philosophical Gourmet Report* (2004 – 2014)