Graduate Seminars

Symbolic logic has proven to be extremely influential in a variety of 20th century disciplines, like philosophy, linguistics, the foundations of mathematics, and computer science. This course is an introduction to the main topics and results in formal logic for graduate students. We will first cover the syntax and semantics of various formal languages, and a selection of proof systems for them. Then we wil discuss and prove some of the central results in the meta-theory of first order logic: completenesss, compactness, the Löwenheim-Skolem theorems, complete theories, notions inexpressible in first order logic, and some applications to first order mathematical theories, like non-standard models of arithmetic. Finally we will discuss the syntax and a variety of semantics for second order logic, the meta-theory of second order logic, and a selection of intensional systems, like modal logic.

This course is an introduction to modal logic. I our intellectual lives, we are interested not only in how things are, but also in how things could be. You are a student at UNC, but you could have studied elsewhere – there is a possible world, as we sometimes say, in which you attend Duke. But it seems there isn’t a possible world in which 2+2=5 – that is an impossibility. And conversely, it seems that it is a necessity that 2+2=4 – in every possible world, 2+2=4. Modal logic is the formal study of possibility and necessity.

In this course we will study prepositional and quantified modal logic. Students will be introduced to a wide variety of modal systems. We will study the syntax of these systems (in particular proof constructions) and their semantics (via possible world interpretations). We will also study the metalogic of modal systems – that is, certain modal systems will themselves be object of study, and we will prove theorems about them (in particular we will construct soundness and completeness proofs). As time allows, we will move on to examine the applications of modal logic to the philosophy of language and metaphysics. We will also investigate the epistemology of modality, addressing the question of how modal claims can be justified. Familiarity with quantificational logic will be assumed, and philosophy 71 or 101 (or their equivalent) is required.

What limits should there be on the state’s use of power to prevent undesirable behavior? We will discuss such traditional topics as the harm principle and the debate between deterrence and retribution. But the most difficult issue we will address is something that lies outside of the traditional debates about criminalization and punishment the issue of preventive detention. May the state lock a person up solely on the basis of his dangerousness without convicting him of a crime? If the answer to that question is Yes, then all the established limits on the state’s power to prevent crime – for one example, that the state may not interfere with a person’s freedom, in the name of preventing crime, unless he has been convicted of a crime – come to very little, and we must rethink the answer to the underlying question. We will look at the sequence of Supreme Court cases in which the doctrine of preventive detention has been worked out, from Salerno v. United States (1988) through Zadvidas v. INS (2001), and into the terrorist cases of the last two years.

What are minds and how are they related to bodies? We shall examine four answers to that question, the standard competing theories of mind: Dualism, Behaviorism, the Identity Theory, and Functionalism. Then we shall take up some special topics: problems of the "aboutness" of mental states, their having distinctive objects or contents; and problems of consciousness, subjectivity, and the qualitative character of sensory experience.

We will discuss various topics in the philosophy of biology, perhaps including (though not necessarily limited to) the concept of an organism, taxonomy and the nature of a biological species, teleology and functional explanation, the concept of a living thing, reduction and the autonomy of biological explanations. This course should be of interest to students of philosophy and also to students of biology. Co-taught by Alex Rosenberg (Duke) and Mark Lange (UNC), meeting at UNC.

We will reconstruct the mature philosophical systems of Descartes, Spinoza, and Leibniz with special attention to comparatively evaluating these systems. The first meeting will focus on the characteristics of rationalism broadly construed and on questions of historical methodology. Plato's allegory of the cave from The Republic and his analysis of love in Symposium will be discussed. Next, for the "big three" heavy emphasis will be placed on canonical statements of their mature positions: The Meditations, the Ethics, and the Monadology, though we will sometimes need to consult other texts. Although it is inevitable that we concentrate on such fundamental ontological and epistemological issues as the nature of mental representation, identity and individuation, necessity and possibility, and the foundations of natural science, we will not ignore moral philosophy. The last session will consider these canonical rationalist systems in light of Hume, Kant, and twenty-first century philosophy. Those taking the course for credit will write things that engage our approach with influential ideas from recent secondary literature.

This course meets on Monday from 12:30 – 3:00 and Wednesday evenings at a time to be arranged. This course is an intensive seminar that will start meeting (twice a week) at the end of September and go through the end of October or the beginning of November. there will be on-going, albeit electronic, discussion with the instructor through the remainder of the term.

Theory of Rational Decision Making (Phil 201)
Michael Resnik

This course will cover the basic mathematical material used in decision theory, game theory and social choice theory (e.g., Bayesian probability theory, expected utility theory, Arrow's theorem, Harsanyi's derivation of utilitarianism), and will examine philosophical issues that arise in connection with this material.

This course will be combined with a similar undergraduate course, Logic (Phil 71). Graduate students in 201 will attend my Logic course, where I will be covering hte buld of my text, Choices. The graduate students in 201 will be responsible for the homework and exams given in 71. In addition they will be expected to meet with me about one half to one third of the term on a weekly basis. We will read additional material in preparation for these meetings. Each student will make one or more oral presentations of some of the material, and submit a written version of their presentations. The course will not be particularly demanding mathematically for most of you. Nor will I expect originality in your presentations, though I will expect them to be organized, clear and informed.

There are a number of choices for additional reading. Those interested in decision theory per se might be interested in reading about the decision theory per se might be interested in reading about the decision theoretic paradoxes and alternative decision theories. Or you might want to read some of the original papers creating the subject discussed in the text. Those interested in political philosophy might be inclined to read parts of Rawl's Theory of Justice, and papers by Harsanyi and Sen. The last time I offered the course we read Hampton's The Authority of Reason. Whatever we decide to read, everyone wil be expected to read the same material.

Relativism is the claim that there are no absolute standards by reference to which objective truth is determined in a given domain (e.g., whether a claim is true, an action is morally right, a decision or a belief is rational, and so on). The purpose of this course is to examine the philosophical and intellectual challenge posed by relativism in various domains (e.g., ethical relativism, cultural relativism, conceptual relativism, epistemological relativism, etc.). Our aim will be to determine whether various 'relativisms' have important elements in common, whether there is a grain of truth in any of them, and what (if any) threat they pose to the ideals of truth and objectivity.

This is an advanced seminar in moral theory and moral psychology. It will be designed around the work of five visitors who we will bring in for the seminar: Robert Adams, Christine Korsgaard, Peter Railton, Joseph Raz, and David Wiggins. In between each visit we will read and discuss the work of the next person to come, with the aim of fully exploiting his or her upcoming visit. We expect the visitors will meet and run the seminar on Monday afternoon, and then go out to dinner with the participants that night. (The cost of dinners will be covered.)

Recently, two quite different models of the rational foundations of social and political norms have been developed. One arises from game theory and public choice theory; the other from theories of of public reason and deliberative democracy. This course will explore the plausibility and limits of these models. Readings will primarily focus on recent work in social, political, and legal theory, but readings from Hume, Kant, and other historical figures will also be included.

The readings in this group will focus on ethics and political philosophy and will be determined in part by the particular interests of the students enrolled in the course. As a default position, I offer three suggestions (from which we could choose one or more):

1. Read work-in-progress from each of the following philosophers, who will come to discuss the work with us: Bernie Boxill, Jan Boxill, Tom Hill, Doug MacLean, Simon May, Amy Peikoff, Jerry Postema, Geoff Sayre-McCord, and Susan Wolf.

2. Read John Broome's Weighing Goods and/or recent articles on the value of human life or on reasoning. Bring John here for a few days to meet with us.

3. Read some philosophical work on the ethics of risk. (Some of my work, but also work by Nozick, Judith Thomson, Scanlon, Sen, Gibbard, and Hacking.)

Topics might include: Are emotions cognitive or noncognitive? Are emotions irrational? Are some emotions more fundamental than others? Are emotions the products of evolution or culture? How are emotions related to morality?